This Note presents the results of an original survey experiment on whether the public prefers “tax expenditures” to “direct outlays”—that is, whether members of the public are more likely to support government spending that takes the form of a tax credit rather than a check or cash. Using a survey that spans a wide variety of policy areas—and with important variations in wording and information—we show that the public strongly prefers tax expenditures even when the “economic substance” of the proposed policies is identical. We also show that the public views tax expenditures as less costly than equivalent direct outlays. These results support a longstanding but largely unstudied hypothesis that tax expenditures “hide” the costs of government spending, and have implications for why tax expenditures have continued to grow in size and complexity.
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INTRODUCTION

A stubborn question in tax law and policy is why some spending programs are organized through the tax code rather than as direct outlays. Both methods are common. For example, Social Security payments are issued directly into the recipients’ accounts. On the other hand, the Earned Income Tax Credit (as its name helpfully suggests) takes the form of a credit against the recipient’s income tax: Eligible beneficiaries simply owe less (or are entitled to a refund) when they file their taxes. Social Security payments are made by the Social Security Administration. The EITC, like all federal tax expenditures, is handled centrally at the IRS.

For some tax experts, the widespread use of “tax expenditures”—policy spending through the tax code, through “deliberate departures from [taxing] accepted concepts of net income”—is concerning. The great tax scholar Stanley Surrey argued famously that one of several problems with tax expenditures is that they are a disguised form of spending, spending that is poorly managed by Congress and almost completely overlooked by the American people. Most tax expenditures, wrote Surrey, “seem almost to live a life of their own, undisturbed and unexamined,” and with “[n]o agency [that] really studies or controls them.” Surrey concluded unhappily that this “is no way to run a tax system.”

In the decades since Surrey’s writing on the subject, questions about the role and value of tax expenditures have only become more relevant. While the Tax Reform Act of 1986

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8 Id. at 7. At the margins, defining what should and should not count as a tax expenditure is a difficult task. Boris Bittker argued such labeling was not possible in a comprehensive way, since there is no neutral baseline of “income” from which tax expenditures that reduce income taxation can be studied. (For example, should reducing the tax bills of the disabled or unemployed count as a subsidy for the affected classes, or simply recognition of a reduced capacity to earn income?) See generally Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” As a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967). Nevertheless we consider the concept useful and believe our questions target policies that deviate from the usual treatment under the Code. Even taking Bittker’s position, our results are still highly relevant. Bittker argued that tax policies should be considered “provision by provision” to see if they are desirable, without reference to whether the policy departs from taxing Haig-Simons income. We show the framing of the policy matters for this “provision by provision” review since it affects how people view the policy. Id. at 925.
eliminated many tax expenditures in the Internal Revenue Code, total tax expenditures have since grown and are now more than eight percent of GDP—$1.4 trillion in 2014. Yet despite the fact that academic studies of tax salience and behavioral taxation have become increasingly popular, basic questions about the public perception of tax expenditures remain largely unanswered. In particular, many of Surrey’s original concerns have avoided rigorous testing: is the true cost of a tax expenditure really hidden or diminished by virtue of being part of the tax code? Is it true that the public sees spending through the tax code as different?

These questions are urgent for an additional reason. In some ways, Surrey got his wish. Tax expenditures are subject to more oversight than ever. “Tax expenditure budgeting,” an annual process by which the federal and state governments account for their spending through the tax code, has become the American norm. Federal law requires the United States Treasury to produce an annual tax expenditure budget, and most states have adopted similar processes. These procedures would no doubt please Surrey, but the continued growth of tax expenditures would not. Indeed, that growth presents a paradox: spending through the tax code has continued to rise faster than government spending as a whole, despite repeated efforts to publicize and rein in tax expenditures.

Our Note helps to explain this apparent paradox. We offer evidence on how the American public thinks about tax expenditures in contrast to spending programs organized outside the tax code. We obtain this evidence through survey experiment that tests how support for (and perceptions of) public spending policies vary not based on the substance or expense of a policy, but simply on whether a policy is described as a tax expenditure or direct outlay. We use Google Consumer Surveys (GCS) to ask panels (which aim to be demographically representative of the United States Internet-using population) for their views on a variety of policy options, including hypothetical subsidies for the housing market and the disabled. We keep the substance and total cost of the policies

10 Id.
13 Google’s methodology has some drawbacks, including permitting only short questions and inducing quick responses from recipients, but it has performed in ways comparable to more traditional telephone surveys. These methodological issues are taken up in detail in Part II.
functionally identical, but ask one group for its views on a policy that is described as a direct expenditure; we ask the other for its views on a policy that is described as a tax break.

By asking similar panels for their views on such questions, we are able to study the way in which a policy’s framing affects public support and public perceptions, and we are able to isolate this framing effect in an empirically rigorous manner. In particular, this method allows us to test the hypothesis that citizens are more likely to support “hidden” spending that occurs through the tax code, rather than “direct” spending that occurs through another policy mechanism, such as direct payment via cash or check. And it allows to test whether tax expenditures simply appear less expensive than direct outlays.

Our results are strongly consistent with both hypotheses. Americans are more likely to support policies when they are described as tax expenditures, and they are more likely to view tax expenditures as cheaper than direct outlays. In our baseline comparisons, respondents were ten percentage points more likely to support our hypothetical, economically equivalent policies when we framed them as tax breaks rather than as direct outlays. These results held true across a variety of policy types, and they held true when we varied the amount of information that we offered about how tax expenditures work. Respondents were also more likely to say that a program added “a lot” to the deficit if it was described as a direct outlay instead of a tax expenditure, even though the programs were listed with the same explicit cost.

These results make several important contributions to the existing literature. First, we apply a better methodology to a wider range of contexts than past studies to help answer significant outstanding questions in the political science, economics, and tax-law literatures. Second, we test the robustness of whether “spending through the tax code” produces a framing effect by varying the amount of information we provide to our survey respondents—results that get at the issue of why citizens are so inclined to favor tax expenditures. Finally, we connect our results to key debates in the economics and political science literatures, and we discuss the implications for economic welfare, modern tax law, and democratic decision-making about public spending.

The rest of this paper is divided into five Parts. First, we position our contribution in the relevant literature on tax expenditures and the behavioral-economics approach to taxation. Second, we describe our methodology in more detail. Third, we offer a fuller description of our results. Fourth, we discuss limitations and implications. The fifth section concludes.

I. Tax Expenditures and Public Perceptions in Context

A. The Existing Tax Literature

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14 We also include a short methodological appendix. See Part VI, infra.
In the tax-law literature, the general distinction between spending inside and outside the tax code is typically associated with the work of Stanley Surrey, who reportedly coined the term “tax expenditure” in a 1967 speech.\(^\text{15}\) Surrey is well known for emphasizing that “[t]he federal income tax system consists really of two parts,” one which “comprises the structural provisions necessary to implement the income tax,” and another that “comprises a system of tax expenditures under which Governmental financial assistance programs are carried out through special tax provisions rather than through direct Government expenditures.”\(^\text{16}\)

Surrey had many criticisms of the tax-expenditure system: He thought it confused Congress,\(^\text{17}\) muddled the administration of social programs,\(^\text{18}\) and made the tax code more complicated.\(^\text{19}\) But a particularly notable theme of Surrey’s work is that tax expenditures are “hidden.”\(^\text{20}\) Despite the fact that tax expenditures are now identified and budgeted like other expenditures—a longtime goal of Surrey’s\(^\text{21}\)—the “hidden” nature of tax expenditures is a theme that still runs through contemporary literature on taxation and public policy. In his book *The Hidden Welfare State*, for example, the political scientist Christopher Howard writes that “tax expenditures with social welfare objectives are largely invisible to citizens, policy makers, and academics who study U.S. social policy.”\(^\text{22}\)

The premise that tax expenditures are or would be treated differently from direct outlays is, in some sense, counterintuitive from the perspective of public finance. Most scholars of public finance would consider tax expenditures to be “conceptually equivalent” to direct outlays.\(^\text{23}\) Indeed, tax expenditures can always be described in a manner that makes


\(^\text{16}\) SURREY, supra note 7, at 6.


\(^\text{18}\) Id. at 729.

\(^\text{19}\) Id. at 731-2.

\(^\text{20}\) Id. at 731 (noting that “comparisons of tax expenditures and direct expenditures must be comparisons of hidden programs with open ones”).

\(^\text{21}\) See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act of 1974, 5 B.C. L. REV. 679, 723 (describing initial budgeting efforts as “a major advance both for those concerned with budget efficiency and for those concerned with tax equity”).


\(^\text{23}\) Id. Nearly all traditional economic models are “outcome equivalent” in that, when there is no uncertainty, actors consider only the final results, not how the results are achieved. This view is incompatible with different preferences for tax expenditures and direct outlays that provide identical results. See, e.g., Claudia R. Sahm, Matthew D. Shapiro & Joel Slemrod, Check in the Mail or More in the Paycheck: Does the Effectiveness of Fiscal Stimulus Depend on How it is Delivered? 4 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 216, 216, (2012) (noting that whether a subsidy is delivered by check or through the tax code is “immaterial in a standard economic model with
them seem identical to direct spending—one in which (as Howard puts it) “taxpayers write a check to the government for their full tax liability, and the government issues them a check to cover those activities exempted from taxation.” As consumers of government benefits, taxpayers should value a dollar of cash just as much as a dollar of tax relief. As taxpayers who fund government programs and vote for elected officials, they should view a dollar of government spending as equivalent to a dollar of foregone tax revenue. Considered at this level of abstraction, public support for a spending program should not depend on whether that spending goes through the tax code.

But do real-life taxpayers actually treat a dollar of direct spending as equivalent to a dollar of tax expenditure? In our opinion, the answer to this question is treated as generally false in the tax-expenditure literature—but has received surprisingly little empirical attention. One of the few tax-law papers to study this subject directly is a 2005 article by Edward Zelinsky; this article used a student survey to assess whether the perceived “volunteer” status of a firefighter was affected by different types of financial support for firefighters. Zelinsky’s subject matter was drawn from a real policy dilemma: increasingly stringent requirements for training firefighters make it difficult for communities to recruit volunteers, but many communities are nonetheless reluctant to pay firefighters directly. As a result, some communities apparently offer tax breaks to their volunteer firefighters, such as property tax reductions.

To see how the different forms of compensation affected public perceptions of these “volunteers,” Zelinsky distributed questionnaires to several groups of law students at the Benjamin N. Cardozo law school. Half were asked whether a direct payment affected the volunteer standing of firefighters, while the other half were asked whether a tax exemption did the same thing. Zelinsky finds strong evidence that respondents are more likely to view recipients of a tax break (rather than the direct payment) as volunteers in good standing.

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rational and unconstrained consumers,” but finding that consumers likely do spend differently when money is received using a different delivery mechanism).

24 Id. at 3-4.

25 There might be some circumstances under which this is not true. As discussed in more detail below, there may be organizational efficiencies in administering a policy either through the tax code (for example, if the IRS must already collect all the information necessary to determine program eligibility) or by direct spending (for example, if non-IRS agency expertise is needed to administer it). See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004). But, for reasons we discuss below, we think this is a very unlikely to explain our results. See infra Part IV.A.2.


27 See id. at 811.

28 Id. at 816.

29 Id. at 799.

30 Id. at 800.
An older tax paper that attempts to study such questions empirically is a book chapter by Steven Sheffrin, *Perceptions of Fairness in the Crucible of Tax Policy*. Sheffrin looks primarily at how the public conceives of a fair sharing of the tax burden, but he also briefly considers the question of how public views diverge from views commonly held by professional economists. To see if the public shares economists’ view that tax expenditures and direct outlays are equivalent, Sheffrin asked 150 students in an economics class about their opinions of an investment subsidy plan for firms. He described the plan in one instance as a $1 million tax break and in the second as a $1 million payment. In the baseline scenario, the students had a similar view of the favorability of the tax break and direct subsidy programs.

However, when asked a follow-up question in which tax credits reduced the companies’ tax liability to zero, the students had a substantially more favorable view of the direct subsidy program. In other words, they preferred the programs under which the firms “paid” some taxes, even if this payment was exactly offset by a check from the government. Sheffrin attributes this result to respondents’ belief that “[e]ntities should pay taxes” and the fact that they were not looking solely at the company’s net position.

Thus while the tax literature has recognized the importance of tax expenditures, relatively little empirical work has been done on whether the public actually thinks of them differently than direct outlays.

**B. Recent Political Science Literature**

Outside of legal scholarship on taxation, two recent political science papers have used survey evidence to study the public’s perception of spending programs. Christopher Faricy and Christopher Ellis asked university students about their opinions of three social spending programs: the mortgage interest deduction, the deduction for retirement savings, and food stamps. They presented the programs to some students as tax expenditures and to others as the equivalent direct outlay, and found weak evidence that respondents preferred identical programs couched as tax expenditures. For each program, the tax expenditure equivalent was more popular than the direct outlay, but this difference was

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38 *Id.* at 325
39 *Id.*
40 *Id.* at 326.
41 *Id.* at 326-7.
42 *Id.* at 327.
44 *Id.* at 62.
45 *Id.* at 68.
small and only statistically significant for one of the three programs. The authors also found that the effect is bigger for Republican students than Democratic students.

Jake Haselswerdt and Brandon Bartels take a similar approach in an unpublished working paper. Unlike the other papers mentioned above and below, Haselswerdt and Bartels do not use a student sample. Instead, like us, they use a survey that attempts to reach a representative sample of the U.S. population. They asked about three programs: the mortgage interest deduction, job training, and paid parental leave. Among other things, they vary the description of the programs as between tax expenditures or equivalent direct outlays. They find that each program is significantly more popular when described as a tax expenditure.

C. Research in Behavioral Economics and Political Framing

The studies above follow a method that is widely employed in behavioral research: asking two demographically similar groups of respondents a question in which the substance is identical but the framing is different. This research agenda seeks to isolate what is now called the framing effect. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman popularized this approach in a classic series of behavioral experiments, finding, for example, that identical life-saving policies are more popular when the outcomes are framed in terms of lives saved rather than lives lost. As applied to tax expenditures, Zelinsky derives a similar result, finding that “policies unacceptable when framed as direct expenditures become supportable when labeled as tax subsidies, even though the economic substance of the policies is the same.”

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46 Id.
47 Id. at 71.
48 Jake Haselswerdt & Brandon L. Bartels, Public Opinion, Policy Tools, and Policy Feedbacks: Evidence from a Survey Experiment (Sept. 16, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). We thank the authors for their permission to cite this work.
49 See id. at 10
50 Id. at 11
51 Id.
52 Id. at 14.
54 For one recent overview (with an emphasis on the underlying biology) see Benedetto De Martino et al., Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making in the Human Brain, 313 SCIENCE 684 (2006).
55 See Zelinsky, supra note 26, at 807 (“A seminal demonstration of framing effects was a now-classic and much emulated experiment in which Professors Tversky and Kahneman asked two comparable but separate groups to decide between two alternative policies in the face of an impending epidemic.”).
57 Zelinsky, supra note 26, at 799.
Political scientists have also considered the relationship between public spending and framing. They have studied, among other things, how different political parties frame their approaches to spending; how political framing differs from political persuasion; and how framing interacts with political competition and citizen competence.

In continuing the study of how tax expenditures are viewed in comparison to direct outlays, we also join an increasingly popular literature of behavioral-economic approaches to tax policy. Among other things, this field is increasingly interested in how general principles of behavioral economics can be applied to tax policy, and in developing original experiments that might inform tax-law design. Many of these studies find that in individuals react to taxes in ways not predicted by standard economic theory.

D. Our Contribution to the Existing Literature

Our approach complements and builds on existing work in several ways.

1. The Representativeness of Our Sample

62 See, e.g., Chetty et al., *supra* note 61 (performing one such experiment).
63 For an overview of these studies, see generally McCaffery & Baron, *supra* note 61.
First, we reach a diverse, non-expert sample that is close to representative of the electorate. All of the other papers, except Haselswerdt and Bartels’s working paper, use student samples. Such samples can be problematic. For example, Sheffrin’s study is designed to illustrate that the public’s views diverge from the views of conventional economics, but the students he surveys were in an economics class.

That is a specific example of a general phenomenon. Student samples often differ from the general population in systematic ways that matter. One survey paper found that student responses “differed substantially” from those of the population at large in 48% of social-science studies where they could be compared. For our purposes, students are likely to differ substantially from the average population on at least two important dimensions: their level of education and their experience paying taxes.

Highly educated people may be less susceptible to framing, particularly those trained in quantitative fields. Zelinsky hypothesizes that this explains differences in the framing effect among his students, and it may be one explanation for why Sheffrin does not initially find a framing effect.

Moreover, students are less experienced with tax expenditures than the population as a whole, which might make them poor proxies. For example, like Faricy and Ellis, and Haselswerdt and Bartels, we ask about the mortgage interest deduction. There are some differences in wording, but all three studies asked about support for the deduction in light of its $100 billion annual cost. Our study and that of Haselswerdt and Bartels—studies aimed at the population at large—found that support was roughly 55%. However, when shown the costs, only 21% of Faricy and Ellis’s students supported the deduction. Faricy and Ellis’s students were likewise not affected by the frame, whereas both our paper and that of Haselswerdt and Bartels find a difference in support of 25 to 35

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65 The Haselswerdt and Bartels survey is tacked onto a larger survey on political opinions. See Haselswerdt and Bartels, supra note 48, at 10. Seeing the other questions in that survey may “prime” people, changing their answers from what they would have said if they were asked about tax expenditures only. Similarly, each person answered three tax expenditure questions. Earlier questions may also prime respondents with regards to later questions, although the authors try to minimize this effect by randomizing the order of the questions. See id.
66 See Sheffrin, supra note 37, at 325.
68 See Ellen Peters et al., Numeracy and Decision Making, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 407 (2006). Peters’s study found that individuals with higher education, and in particular higher numeracy were less susceptible to the frame. However, the general applicability of this study is unclear because the frame in that case was entirely mathematical (two ways of presenting the same number).
69 See Zelinsky, supra note 26, at 818. Zelinsky found that men’s opinions differed less depending on the frame than women’s, and speculated that this was because men were more likely to be trained in economics, math or business.
70 Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 48, at 22.
percentage points.\textsuperscript{72} As a result, we believe that our results are a more reliable measure of the framing effect than those derived from student samples.

2. Distinguishing Our Questions and Implications

In addition to studying a more representative sample, our approach differs from previous work in several ways. First, we explore the framing effect in a range of substantive policy areas, including support for housing programs, aid to the disabled, and the question of whether people prefer to receive cash or equivalent tax credits and whether they perceive tax expenditures to be less expensive. Taken together, this variation helps show that the framing effect is wide-ranging and sheds light on the source of that effect.\textsuperscript{73}

Second, we show that the public’s preference for tax expenditures persists even when we describe the mechanics of a tax expenditure in some detail. This helps ensure that the source of the framing effect is not confusion over how the tax programs work or who gets the benefit. Haselswerdt and Bartels, as well as Faricy and Ellis, are unclear about the mechanics of their programs. For example, while Faricy and Ellis express concern that citizens do not understand tax expenditures, they do not pursue the insight empirically.\textsuperscript{74} Instead, the questions in their study and in that of Haselswerdt and Bartels are sufficiently vague to raise questions about their conclusions.

For example, Haselswerdt and Bartels ask respondents whether they support making those who take a job retraining class “eligible for a tax break, that is a reduction in the income tax they owe to help cover the cost of the class,” and similarly describing the direct expenditure as simply “a cash payment to help cover the cost of the class.”\textsuperscript{76} People may simply assume that the payments will be larger or smaller depending on which vehicle is used for payments. Even in other questions where the researchers specify the total cost, the programs are not necessarily equivalent in terms of how much each person receives.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{72} See Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 48, at 29.
\textsuperscript{73} Zelinsky’s work on the perception of volunteers is somewhat limited by the narrow focus of the study. People carry unique ideas about what, if any, personal benefits can be obtained while still being considered a volunteer, which likely interact with their perceptions of tax expenditures relative to direct outlays. See Ram A. Cnaan et al., Defining Who Is a Volunteer: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations, 25 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 364 (1996) (describing the wide dispersion in definitions and empirically held beliefs about what constitutes a “volunteer”).
\textsuperscript{74} See Faricy and Ellis, supra note 43, at 58. While we find that increasing the amount of information about the mechanics of the tax expenditure does not have a big impact, we think it is important to know that the framing effect does not stem from uncertainty or misunderstanding about how the program works.
\textsuperscript{76} See Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 48, at 35. Their mortgage interest question is similarly vague.
\textsuperscript{77} See id. at 35-36 (Note that this criticism does not apply to their final question on paid parental leave where the payments are specified at 100% of lost income.); Faricy & Ellis, supra note 43, at 62, 74-75.
Third, we avoid using existing programs—except the mortgage interest deduction—to measure the framing effect. All of the programs that Faricy and Ellis study are currently implemented in the United States, as are two-thirds of those studied by Haselswerdt and Bartels.

Asking about these “status quo” programs is potentially problematic for a number of reasons. Rational respondents might prefer not to change only the mechanism by which an existing program is delivered, since switching the mechanism is presumably costly and the substance of the program will remain the same. In addition, respondents might simply be confused as to why an existing program is being framed as a hypothetical choice. They may pick the status quo when a choice is too complex; they may pick it in protest. Or, respondents may simply be affected by the well-known status quo bias, which has been extensively studied in behavioral economics.

The notable point is that, in each of these scenarios, something other than a question’s framing—as either a tax expenditure or direct outlay—may generate part of the question’s response.

Such status-quo issues are well understood to be a problem in survey design. Indeed, the difference between new and status quo options can be enormous, even when the real payoff is the same. One well-known study of individual biases toward risk, for example, found that only 27% of survey respondents were willing to pay $700 for a safety measure that guaranteed a 0.5% reduction in the risk of an injury in a given year; that number jumped to 60% when the safety feature in question was described as an industry standard.

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78 See Faricy & Ellis, supra note 43, at 61 (“[A]ll three programs mirror existing federal programs in cost, intent, and actual redistributive effects.”).
79 See Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 48, at 35-36
80 See Wiktor Adamowicz et al., Stated Preference Approaches for Measuring Passive Use Values: Choice Experiments and Contingent Valuation, 80 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 64, 73 (1998) (“It could be that individuals chose the status quo response when the task of selecting options was too complex or when they were un-certain about the trade-offs they would be willing to make. Choosing the status quo could also be a form of protest response.”).
82 See David Dreyer Lassen, The Effect of Information on Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 103, 105 (2005) (“Uncertainty about [an] issue could take the form of a status quo bias, documented in a variety of settings, leading uncertain voters to vote for the status quo where abstaining, according to the reasoning in the models, would be optimal.”).
problems were considered worrying enough that respondents who always selected a status quo were categorized along with respondents who selected “I don’t know.” We should note that Haselswerdt and Bartels are aware of this issue and in fact one of their goals is to measure whether the status quo “communicat[es] to the public how different problems should be viewed and solved.” But we are not sure that they can separate this effect from the other status quo issues discussed above.

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, we consider the implications of these findings in ways that differ greatly from previous work. We explore the likely underlying causes of the framing effect, as well as the relationship between framing effects and welfare economics. We then highlight the implications of citizens’ preference for tax expenditures on how the Internal Revenue Code is written. We use our results to suggest a new and counterintuitive explanation for why tax expenditures have grown: because the public is actually paying more attention to government budgets. We also suggest that the public’s fondness for tax expenditures should be added to the traditional list of factors that drive the increasing complexity of the tax code and is perhaps one of the best explanations for why ordinary taxpayers find the tax system so maddeningly complex. Finally, we make a new connection between tax expenditures and other areas of the law where increasing transparency has potentially serious drawbacks.

II. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

A. Using Google Consumer Surveys

We developed a survey instrument using Google Consumer Surveys (GCS), a popular and relatively inexpensive online survey tool designed for use by both companies and researchers. GCS is a relatively new service—the product was launched in March 2012—but it has already been used to produce peer-reviewed papers in a variety of fields, including political science, psychology, and business.

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84 See Adamowicz, et al., supra note 43, at 68 n.3 (“We are assuming that individuals who always chose the status quo regardless of the attribute levels were essentially not responding to the CE task. Thus these responses were treated the same as an ‘I don’t know’ response in a CVM question.”).

85 See Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 48, at 7.


88 See, e.g., Jessica Lavariega Monforti, Melissa Michelson & Annie Franco, ¿Por Quién Votará? Experimental Evidence About Language, Ethnicity and Vote Choice (Among Republicans), 1 POL., GROUPS & IDENTITIES 475, 481 (2013) (“By asking different single questions of multiple
We discuss in detail below the extent to which our panel is likely to be representative of the U.S. population. We conclude that there are some reasons to believe that our panel is not fully representative—but, in the end, it is likely to be close, and offers substantial advantages over the classroom surveys utilized in the existing published literature.

Unlike several other online survey tools—which hire a representative panel of respondents or otherwise manage a marketplace for survey questions—GCS presents survey questions to general Internet users in the form of a “wall” standing in front of access to premium Internet content. Just as a visitor to a website might be required to watch an advertisement or pay a fee before accessing premium content (typically known as a “paywall”), GCS lets Internet users answer a survey question. This “surveywall” is intended to be relatively brief and painless. Google’s theory is that, “[b]y reducing the burden [of responding to a survey] to just one or two clicks, we increase the response rate of the survey.” According to Google, this produces an average response rate of

samples [using GCS], researchers can conduct a survey experiment . . . . The tool is ideal for survey experiments . . . because randomized assignment to different questions holds unobserved variables constant.” (citation omitted)). This paper uses GCS to consider how voters respond to identical candidates who are or are not bilingual.

89 See, e.g., Andrew K. Przybylski, Who Believes Electronic Games Cause Real World Aggression?, 17 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAV. & SOC. NETWORKING 228, 229 (2014) (“GCS produces highly accurate results in line with other probability-based panel survey approaches. Importantly, GCS demonstrates substantially higher response rates (15–20%) compared to sampling rates observed industry wide (0.1–2%) across a range of polling topics.”). This paper uses GCS to study national beliefs about the relationship between violent video games and real-life violence.

90 See, e.g., Shane Frederick, Leonard Lee & Ernest Baskin, The Limits of Attraction, forthcoming J. MARKETING RES. (2014) (“Though our prior results – and, more to the point, our repeated non-results – led us to predict no attraction effect when quality was represented visually, we were curious whether the marginally significant repulsion effect obtained above would replicate, so we re-ran the study using Google Surveys, which enabled us to quickly obtain very large samples.”). This paper uses a variety of survey tools — including GCS and Mechanical Turk — to study the prevalence of the “attraction effect,” wherein the addition of an irrelevant third consumption option changes consumer perceptions of the two preexisting options.

91 See, e.g., YOUGov, https://today.yougov.com/ (lasted visited Jan. 6, 2014); see also Siona Robin Listokin, Yair Listokin & Samson Mesele, Americans’ Preferences for Tax Increases and Spending Cuts 139 TAX NOTES 188 (2013) (using YouGov to examine how Americans would alter spending and taxes to close the budget deficit).


94 McDonald, Mohebbi & Slatkin, supra note 48, at 3.
Google argues that this response rate compares favorably to other commonly used Internet or traditional phone survey tools.\footnote{95} Unlike many other survey tools, Google does not ask respondents to report their age, gender, location, income, or other demographic information. Instead, Google reports that “Consumer Surveys infers approximate demographic and location information using the respondent’s IP address and DoubleClick cookie,” which Google uses to “ensure each survey receives a representative sample and to enable survey researchers to see how sub-populations answered questions.”\footnote{97} Not asking for this information improves response rates and allows questions to be asked free of any survey “priming.”\footnote{98} We discuss the accuracy of Google’s inferences below and include further details of GCS’s methodology in a short Appendix.

The representativeness and reliability of the GCS survey population have been tested and discussed favorably in two studies—one from the Pew Foundation\footnote{99} and one from Google itself.\footnote{100} Google’s study compared GCS surveys to “gold standard” national telephone surveys—one private and one conducted by the Centers for Disease Control—by using questions identical to those in the “gold standard” surveys. Google also hired two well-respected Internet survey firms to ask the same questions.\footnote{101} The search giant concluded that its own survey tool outperforms other Internet survey providers on several benchmarks.\footnote{102}

The Pew Research Center, meanwhile, performed “a series of tests covering a wide range of topics and question types to compare results from Pew Research telephone surveys to those obtained using the Google Consumer Surveys method.”\footnote{104} GCS performed relatively well overall. Across forty-three questions, the median difference between GCS and the Pew surveys was 3%.\footnote{105} Of particular interest for our survey, Pew concluded: “A comparison of several demographic questions asked by Pew Research indicates that the Google Consumer Surveys sample appears to conform closely to the demographic

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{95}{Id.}
\item \footnote{96}{Id.}
\item \footnote{97}{Id (citations omitted).}
\item \footnote{98}{Id. (“Inferring this demographic data enables Consumer Surveys researchers to ask fewer questions in a survey which in turn increases response rates.”).}
\item \footnote{99}{SCOTT KEETER & LEAH CHRISTIAN, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, A COMPARISON OF RESULTS FROM SURVEYS BY THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER AND GOOGLE CONSUMER SURVEYS (2012).}
\item \footnote{100}{McDonald, Mohebbi & Slatkin, supra note 86.}
\item \footnote{101}{See McDonald, Mohebbi & Slatkin, supra note 86, at 5.}
\item \footnote{102}{Id. at 6-9. For example, Google reports that the “average absolute error for the non-Google samples was 5.29% across all benchmarks, while the Google samples averaged 3.76%.” Id. at 7. GCS attempts to target the internet-using population, while the benchmark surveys were aimed at the whole population, and therefore we should not be surprised to see some differences.}
\item \footnote{104}{KEETER & CHRISTIAN, supra note 99, at 1.}
\item \footnote{105}{Id. at 2. The mean was 6%, driven by a few questions in which the differences were relatively large. Id. There may be innocent explanations for these differences, as in some cases the Pew questions and potential answers did not entirely match what GCS put out. Id.}
\end{itemize}
composition of the overall internet population.” In terms of political views, GCS respondents were “broadly similar [to the U.S. population], though some larger differences were observed.” Nor was there a consistently conservative or liberal bent to these differences. In fact, Nate Silver concluded that GCS was the second most accurate 2012 presidential poll, beating out CNN, Quinnipiac, Gallup, and YouGov—among others.

Nonetheless, there are good reasons to believe our panel is not perfectly representative of the entire U.S. population. First, Google surveys only the U.S. Internet-using population, and 15% of the U.S. population does not use the Internet. These individuals are disproportionately older and less educated—which likely biases any survey of Internet users. Similarly GCS’s model does not guarantee that each panel is a random sample of all Internet users. Nevertheless, the research discussed above suggests it is quite likely that GCS is close to representative—and certainly a large improvement over the classroom panels used in prior research. It is also likely to be much more representative than Mechanical Turk, where survey respondents are paid for each survey they complete, raising a number of problems. In spite of these problems, Mechanical Turk studies have found generally receptive audiences.

106 Id.
107 Id. at 9.
108 Id. at 10.
111 Id. at 5. We think it very likely that our sample skews toward more educated respondents, which means that we actually underestimate the framing effect.
112 See, e.g., Kuziemko et al., supra note 54, at 7 (discussing how the authors confronted issues with Mechanical Turk including foreign professional survey takers and how survey release times had to be altered to minimize the impact of these professionals); Dan Kahan, Fooled Twice, Shame on Who? Problems with Mechanical Turk Study Samples, Part 2, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (July 10, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2013/7/10/fooled-twice-shame-on-who-problems-with-mechanical-turk-stud.html [http://perma.cc/3KGU-MFUM] (noting a variety of problems with Mechanical Turk panels, including selection issues with voluntary Mechanical Turk workers, problems of repeated exposure to research studies, and misrepresentation among survey participants).
113 See, for example, articles published in prominent economics and political science journals such as Justin Grimmer, Solomon Messing, & Sean Westwood, How Words and Money Cultivate a Personal Vote: The Effect of Legislator Credit Claiming on Constituent Credit Allocation, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 703 (2012) (using Mechanical Turk to gather information about how people react to political officials claiming credit for government spending); Douglas L. Kriner & Francis X. Shen, How Citizens Respond to Combat Casualties: The Differential Impact of Local
GCS does have some important drawbacks. First, we can ask only short questions. Google imposes a 175-character limit on questions, which forced us to think hard about how we worded our questions, and made it a challenge to ask several questions about technical tax policy. Second, because GCS questions pop up instantaneously, respondents see the question before committing to answer—an issue that affects most Internet surveys but is arguably more problematic in our case. Third, the fact that individual respondents will see only one question makes it impossible to study an individual respondent’s answers across questions.

On the other hand, GCS also offers some practical benefits. Consumer Surveys are inexpensive—which allows us to gather many thousands of fairly representative observations at low cost—and have a relatively high response rate. In our surveys, an average of 18% to 24% of Internet users who saw each question responded. In addition, the fact that Google matches respondents to demographic data means that we do not need to rely on respondents’ self-reporting to obtain a panel that is representative. Unlike Mechanical Turk, GCS also excludes users who answer surveys to earn money. We also do not have to rely on respondents’ self-reporting about sensitive matters, including age and income.

B. Our Survey Questions

The central goal of our survey was to ask two demographically equivalent groups of respondents whether they supported economically equivalent policy proposals—one described in the form of a tax expenditure, the other in the form of a direct outlay. Our central hypothesis, consistent with the notion that spending through the tax code disguises the true cost, was that respondents will be more likely to support policies that take the form of tax expenditures.

We also tested several secondary questions by varying the details of our questions. One secondary question is whether the hypothesis above works because respondents view tax expenditures as “cheaper.” We tested this by asking respondents how they perceived the costs of equivalent tax expenditures and direct outlays, and whether they would prefer to

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Casualties on Support for the War in Afghanistan, 76 PUB. OPINION Q. 761 (2012) (detailing a Mechanical Turk experiment designed to explore whether support for wars varied when respondents read a mock-account of a casualty from their state or from elsewhere); and Emily Oster, Ira Shoulson & E. Ray Dorsey, Optimal Expectations and Limited Medical Testing: Evidence from Huntington Disease, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 804 (2013) (relying in part on Mechanical Turk data for information on how and why Americans save for retirement). In particular, our direct spending equivalent to the mortgage interest deduction had to be modified. We did not have space to create an exactly equivalent program in which the percentage reimbursement increases with the taxpayer’s income (as with the actual mortgage interest deduction). For the other questions, without GCS’s character limits, we might have added more detail about why the policy might be a good idea and who would be eligible. Generally, however, we felt that we were able to communicate all the information we wanted to communicate, despite the limits.
receive a tax credit or a check. Another secondary question is whether taxpayers’ preference for tax expenditures holds true across a range of policy types; we tested this question by asking about hypothetical policies that support the housing market and hypothetical subsidies for the disabled. A third secondary question is whether respondents’ views vary depending on whether the policy in question is a new, hypothetical policy, or an existing and salient policy; we probed this question by asking about the home mortgage-interest deduction. In a short second survey we also ask whether the label “tax-expenditure” had any salient meaning for the public.

A fourth secondary question is whether respondents’ views change depending on how much information we provide about the policy proposals in question. Because tax policy is relatively technical, in our view it is important to try and distinguish between the framing effect and simple ambiguities in (or misunderstandings of) how the policies in question operate. For example, it might be apparent to those steeped in tax law or public finance that a dollar of “refundable tax credit” is the conceptual equivalent of a dollar in cash—but perhaps not to the average citizen. To get a sense of how this affects our results, we varied our descriptions of the tax expenditure in several questions. In some cases, we spelled out in detail how “refundable tax credits operate”; in others we did not. We also tested to see whether using the term “tax expenditure” itself affects the results.

Finally, we asked several questions designed to rule out common alternative explanations that might explain a bias toward spending through the tax code, and to see whether policy preferences diverged from individual consumption preferences.

In our first wave, we asked the following nine questions:

Q1. Would you support the government offering annual $1000 cash payments to each family, to help cover rent?

Q2. Would you support reducing each family's taxes by $1000 to help cover rent? If a family owes less than $1000, they get the rest in cash.

Q3. Would you support the government offering a $1000 refundable tax credit for each family, to help cover rent?

Q4. Do you support the government letting homeowners deduct their mortgage interest payments?

Q5. Would you support the government replacing existing tax aid for homeowners by matching 25% of their mortgage interest with cash?

115 Each question also included information required for informed consent telling respondents that “this is an academic study” and that their participation was “voluntary and anonymous,” which we have removed for convenience here.
Q6. Tax aid for homeowners costs $100 billion a year. At the same cost, would you instead support matching 25% of their mortgage interest with cash?

Q7. Tax aid for homeowners costs $100 billion a year. Do you support the government continuing to let them deduct their mortgage interest payments?

Q8. Would you support an annual $1000 government cash payment to each disabled person?

Q9. Would you support a tax credit reducing each disabled person's taxes by $1000? If a person owes less than $1000, he or she gets the rest in cash.

We released these questions in November 2013, spread over a weekend and three weekdays.

The demographics of respondents and responses we received did not vary by day of the week, indicating that the pool of potential respondents was similar during weekdays and weekends. We received a little over 1,000 responses to each question. (However, as can be seen in Table 1 below, not all of these responses are usable since some respondents chose to opt out and others lack full demographic data.) There is some

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116 The response rate did vary some, for example it was higher during weekends, but given the similarity of responses, we are not concerned that this variation will bias the results, particularly since the relative portion of weekday and weekend responders is the same across questions. 117 If people opted-out at random, then our survey will still be representative of the U.S. internet using population—as a rough intuition: think of throwing random individuals out of a random sample, you’ll still have a random sample. Some of the opting-out, however, appears to be non-random since it is slightly correlated with people’s demographic characteristics.

In particular, younger respondents opted out more than older ones. The differences are not generally very substantial: roughly 20% of our sample should have been 18-24, but only 15% were (differences in the other age groups are smaller). Likewise slightly more women opted out than men. There was no evidence that people with different incomes opted out at different rates.

If this opt-out behavior random within demographic groups, it still will not present a problem because we can fix the issues using probability weighting. For example imagine there should be 20 people in each of 5 age groups. If 10 people opt out of the first age group, but everyone else answers in the rest of the groups, we can get the “right” result by giving each respondent in age group one a double weight.

In the end, while we think it is unlikely that opt-out behavior within groups is entirely random, we have no reason to believe that this should substantially bias the results. In particular, we do not see any opting out based on income, which we think is the variable most likely to be correlated with unobserved characteristics (e.g., education) that also correlate with people’s reaction to the frame.

Likewise, we do not see any evidence of opt-out behavior being different across different questions by age, sex, or income group, which might otherwise threaten to bias our comparisons across questions.
evidence of more respondents’ opting out of the more complex questions. But we remain confident that this skew is relatively minor. Even if, for the sake of argument, each additional person who opted out of the more complex questions reduces the significance of our results, our results would still remain both statistically and economically significant.\footnote{An example may be illustrative. For example, 29 fewer respondents with full demographic information answered Question 8 (the direct subsidy to disabled persons) than Question 9 (the tax expenditure version of that program). Respondents favored the credit over the direct subsidy by roughly 10 percentage points. This remains true even if we treat the additional 29 opt-outs for question 9 as not supporting the policy. Doing so reduces the gap to 8 percentage points, which remains economically and statistically significant. This is true for all paired questions. However, we believe this overstates the true differences in beliefs among selective opt-outs. It is likely that people who avoid more complex questions are more likely to react to the frame, and thus that any selective opting out on this basis probably causes an under rather than overstatement of the true framing effect presented below.}

In February 2014 we asked a relatively small second survey designed to ascertain whether applying the label “tax expenditure” to spending through the tax code made any difference. In April 2014 we asked a larger sample about their preferences for personally receiving direct-payment subsidies or tax credits. Finally, in September 2014, we asked a large sample about how they perceived the costs of direct outlays and tax expenditures.

Our results are summarized in the following tables:
## III. RESULTS

### Summary of Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Respondents with Full Demographic Info</th>
<th>Weighted Using Demographic Info</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initial Survey (November '13)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1. Would you support the government offering annual $1000 cash payments to each family, to help cover rent?</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>Yes 24.09 % No 75.91 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2. Would you support reducing each family's taxes by $1000 to help cover rent? If a family owes less than $1000, they get the rest in cash.</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>Yes 33.92 % No 66.08 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3. Would you support the government offering a $1000 refundable tax credit for each family, to help cover rent?</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>Yes 35.09 % No 64.91 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4. Do you support the government letting homeowners deduct their mortgage interest payments?</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>Yes 67.50 % No 32.50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5. Would you support the government replacing existing tax aid for homeowners by matching 25% of their mortgage interest with cash?</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>Yes 25.50 % No 74.50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6. Tax aid for homeowners costs $100 billion a year. At the same cost, would you instead support matching 25% of their mortgage interest with cash?</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>Yes 20.02 % No 79.98 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q7. Tax aid for homeowners costs $100 billion a year. Do you support the government continuing to let them deduct their mortgage interest payments?</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>Yes 56.15 % No 43.85 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q8. Would you support an annual $1000 government cash payment to each disabled person?</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>Yes 29.73 % No 70.27 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9. Would you support a tax credit reducing each disabled person's taxes by $1000? If a person owes less than $1000, he or she gets the rest in cash.</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>Yes 40.23 % No 59.77 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Later Survey (February '14)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10. Would you support a tax expenditure reducing each family's taxes by $1K to help cover rent? If a family owes less than $1K, they get the rest in cash.</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>Yes 37.10 % No 62.90 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11. Would you support reducing each family's taxes by $1000 to help cover rent? If a family owes less than $1000, they get the rest in cash.</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>Yes 36.82 % No 63.18 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grey bars are only for readability.

Only individuals with full demographic information are used in the weighted calculation. Roughly 15% of respondents are missing such demographic information (age, gender, geography). "Weighting" the data means adjusting for the fact that the samples were more slightly more likely pick up members of some demographic groups than others. In practice the reweighting does not make much difference because the characteristics of samples and the U.S. internet using population are similar.

Note Q11 is identical to Q2, we obtained responses again to ensure that the survey was still reaching the same audience and that attitudes had not shifted. The response is very similar.
Survey on Preferences for Receiving Direct Subsidies Relative to Tax Credits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Respondents with Full Demographic Info</th>
<th>Weighted Using Demographic Info</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q12. Would you prefer a credit reducing your tax bill by $1000 (given as cash if you owe less than $1000) or a $1000 check? (This is an academic study.)</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>Indiff: 36.68 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Check: 43.00 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Credit: 20.31 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13. Same as Q12 except options are:</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>Indiff: 37.91 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Check: 43.27 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Credit: 19.72 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14. Would you prefer a refundable tax credit reducing your tax bill by $1000 or a $1000 check? (This is an academic study.)</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>Indiff: 32.05 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Check: 50.39 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Credit: 17.56 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q15. Same as Q12 except options are:</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>Indiff: 43.37 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Check: 33.75 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Credit: 22.88 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q16. Would you prefer a one-time credit reducing your tax bill by $1000 or a one-time $1000 check? (This is an academic study.)</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>Indiff: 42.68 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Check: 40.69 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Credit: 16.63 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey of Respondents' Perception of Policy Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Respondents with Full Demographic Info</th>
<th>Weighted Using Demographic Info</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q17. Some propose spending $6 billion to reduce each blind person's taxes by $1,000 (paid in cash if they owe less than $1,000). How much will this increase the deficit?</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>Not at all: 24.65 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not that much: 43.82 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A lot: 31.54 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18. Some propose spending $6 billion to provide each blind person with a $1,000 cash payment. How much will this increase the deficit?</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>Not at all: 22.81 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not that much: 40.33 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A lot: 36.87 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents' perception that the tax expenditure would add less to the deficit than the direct outlay is statistically significant at the 5% level (p = 0.015) when data is tested using an ordered logit regression. Using a multinomial logit produces a similar result (p=.003).
Our results strongly confirm the central hypothesis that individuals prefer spending through the tax code to direct expenditures. In our baseline comparisons, respondents were about 10 percentage points more likely to support policy proposals when they were described as tax expenditures and not as direct outlays. This held true across policy types: respondents were 10.5 percentage points more likely to support a subsidy for the disabled when it was phrased as a tax expenditure, and 9.8 percentage points more likely to support a subsidy for the rental market when described in similar terms. Respondents also very strongly preferred the existing mortgage-interest deduction to an alternative policy in which the government directly matched a portion of homeowner mortgage payments. All of these results were statistically significant at the 1% level.
We had hypothesized that more information about how tax expenditures work would push some respondents to think about the underlying similarities between spending through the tax code and direct spending. For example, noting that “[i]f a family owes less than $1000, they get the rest in cash,” probably underscores these similarities more than offering that each family gets “a $1000 refundable tax credit.” But surprisingly and notably, respondents were only slightly more likely to support a tax expenditure when we offered less information about it, and the difference was not statistically significant. The difference in language between tax expenditures and direct outlays did not appear to alert respondents to the functional equivalence, at least not to a statistically significant extent. The amount of information we offered does not seem to have substantially affected how respondents interpreted our questions, a finding that we think merits further inquiry.

Similarly, in our later survey, when we asked people whether they preferred a $1000 check or an equivalent tax credit, more information did not reduce the impact of the frame: when given more information, people were a bit more likely to conclude that the two options were equally good, but that the difference is not statistically significant. On balance, we found these results surprising and believe they have important implications (discussed below) for tax policy. We do not find that using the term “tax expenditure” has any effect relative to simply describing the tax reduction.

We also found that respondents have a strong personal preference for receiving a check (rather than a tax reduction) from the government: That is, while individuals would prefer to see tax expenditures enacted as policy, they would prefer to receive direct outlays. (This would to be consistent with the hypothesis that tax expenditures seem cheaper: The other side of the coin is that they might seem less valuable.)

Finally, and also consistent with the hypothesis that tax expenditures seems cheaper, we found that respondents were less likely to think that tax expenditures contributed substantially to the deficit. Specifically, 37% said a $6 billion dollar direct spending program added “a lot” to the deficit, while only 32% said equivalent spending through the tax code would add as much.

**IV. Discussion**

Our results strongly confirm that individuals prefer spending through the tax code to direct expenditures, and are consistent with the framing effect. The results also suggest that the framing effect holds in a sample of survey respondents that are representative of the national Internet-using population, across a range of policy types, and when more information on tax expenditures is provided. Our evidence also suggests that the framing effect is at least partly driven by a perception that tax expenditures are cheaper from the point of view of the fisc, but are likewise less valuable to receive personally.

In this Part, we discuss our results more fully. In Part IV.A, we discuss some limitations and hypotheses that we hope will provide a basis for future research on why taxpayers prefer spending through the tax code. In Part IV.B, we discuss the implications of our results for tax law and policy.
A. Directions for Future Research

Our results are limited in a few respects. Some of these are general problems of single-question Internet surveys: For example, our respondents did not spend hours thinking about these questions. The average response time was about twenty seconds. While this response time in some ways limits inferences about respondents’ “true preferences,” as discussed below, it also perhaps captures how some voters actually perceive and evaluate these questions in the political marketplace. In the context of political advertisements and platforms, voters do not necessarily spend long periods of time puzzling over the details.

Nonetheless, a few remaining issues strike us as especially interesting and relevant for further discussion and research. In this section, we focus on two possible explanations for why respondents seem to have a stubborn preference for tax expenditures. First, we discuss the well-known framing effect, and why it might exist. Second, we discuss possible reasons why a “rational citizen” or “rational voter” might prefer to channel spending programs through the tax code. While we are ultimately skeptical about these latter explanations, we think they are important to discuss alongside our results.

1. Why Would a Framing Effect Exist?

As described above, there is a large literature in psychology, economics, and political science attempting to clarify how framing a decision affects responses. If one takes the view that a dollar spent inside the tax code is functionally equivalent to a dollar spent outside it, then our results support the existence of a framing effect in this context.

Our results suggest that taxpayers prefer tax expenditures, in part, because they perceive them as less expensive for the public fisc. Taxpayers felt that direct spending programs increased the deficit more substantially than equivalent tax expenditures, even though the explicit cost was the same. The other side of this coin is that people are more likely to prefer receiving a dollar of cash over a dollar of tax relief because they perceive a dollar of cash to be more valuable, even when we subtly emphasize that they are the same (for example, in Question 13).

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119 See the Appendix for more details.
120 For a pessimistic discussion of how voters think, see Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, It Feels Like We’re Thinking: The Rationalizing Voter and Electoral Democracy, http://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/AchenBartels011107/AchenBartels011107.pdf
One might worry that the immediate reward survey-takers get from finishing the survey (access to desired Internet content) may skew responses, even compared to busy voters. However, this skew is probably not too severe given that GCS performed comparably to traditional surveys that lack this instant gratification feature.
121 See supra notes 27-32.
This fits our intuitions—and the scholarly literature—about how citizens view the tax code. Providing a dollar of tax relief might be viewed as letting a person keep something she already possesses; some citizens might not even realize that they are in fact receiving a benefit from a government policy. This taps into an intuitive and common—though, in many ways problematic—assumption about the nature of taxation and government, in which one’s “pretax income” represents a natural state of justice that precedes government intervention. We think this view is somewhat misguided: after all, one’s pretax income depends crucially on a system of public order that could not exist without government intervention (and, hence, taxation). But the view that pretax income is naturally just is commonly held.

Note that this theory has a subtle connection to the first studies of the framing effect, in which respondents preferred a triage policy that emphasized the lives saved rather than lives lost, even if the totals were the same. Likewise, we find it plausible that respondents prefer policies that let citizens “keep their own hard-earned money” to those that give citizens benefits from an amorphous government larder.

We think that this view likely explains much of the framing effect we witness here. We also think that teasing apart these explanations more directly would be a valuable direction for future research.

2. Can Rational Voters Prefer Tax Expenditures?

A related issue is that we do not eliminate every possible reason why a “rational” voter might prefer tax expenditures to direct outlays—although we do attempt to rule out some of these alternative explanations. For example, it could be that voters view tax expenditures as more politically stable or permanent. Zelinsky, for example, raises this prospect when he notes that a tax expenditure, “if embedded in a permanent tax code, may be more secure politically than a cash payment, which must be appropriated annually.” While we think this is plausible, we are unconvinced that it explains a large proportion of the framing effect. Our most recent wave of questions—which includes a question emphasizing that both the tax expenditure and the direct outlay are “one-time” only—still displays a robust framing effect.

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122 See Suzanne Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State: The Challenges of Social Policy Reform in the Obama Era, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 803, 809 (2010) (finding that many recipients of tax expenditures do not even realize they are benefiting from a government program).


Alternatively, it could be the case that voters and policymakers view spending through the tax system as less amenable to “regulatory capture” than a program administered by a specialist agency that interacts repeatedly with a specific part of the economy. But while we have not tested this hypothesis, we think it unlikely that aversion to “regulatory capture” explains a large proportion of the framing effect. Details of tax and spending administration are not very salient, to put it mildly, and we think it improbable that most taxpayers consider the difference in program administration—much less the difference in likelihood of capture based on the administrative scheme.

Finally, spending through the tax code might be preferred based on how voters evaluate a tradeoff between specialization and coordination. If voters think that certain spending activities are most efficiently clustered together in the tax system, then they will prefer tax expenditures over direct outlays. However, given the simplicity of the programs that we proposed in our experiment, we find it unlikely that this last explanation is at work in our responses.

We should note one element of our results that we think can be explained by rational behavior: the questions about mortgage interest showed the widest gap between the proposed direct spending program and existing spending routed through the Code, and there are many plausible explanations for these results. We felt it important to ask these questions because they deal with one of the best-known tax expenditures. Because the mortgage deduction is an existing program, the public’s preference for keeping this policy might simply reflect a quite rational preference for the status quo—as opposed to switching to a new and very similar system and incurring related costs. That said, the status quo bias cannot explain the entire preference for spending through the Code, since the framing effect is seen in responses to questions that propose hypothetical programs unrelated to the status quo.

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129 See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165 (1993) (arguing that there are valid procedural reasons related to interest group capture for promoting public spending through the tax code).

130 See HOWARD, supra note 15, at 3 (“[T]ax expenditures . . . are largely invisible to citizens, policy makers, and academics.”).

131 For more on these questions see Weisbach & Nussim, supra note18, at 961. Weisbach and Nussim argue that piggy-backing spending programs onto the tax code makes sense when there is significant overlap between the information the IRS will need anyway and the information needed to administer the program in question, for example, the earned income tax credit. On the other hand, for other programs there is little overlap in required information, and there would be other problems with IRS administration (for example, if payments need to be made more than once a year), and therefore the program should be directly administered by an agency (for instance, food stamps).

132 Indeed Weisbach and Nussim argue that their theory of tax expenditures is novel, and Americans have likely not begun to widely consider the specialization versus coordination tradeoff when examining spending through the Code.

133 See supra the discussion of potential status quo bias in Part I.D.2.
B. Implications

Our findings have several implications for tax law and the debate over tax expenditures, which we discuss some here.

1. Economic and Welfare Implications

One set of implications concerns public welfare. Indeed, the framing effect raises a question that appears frequently in behavioral economics: how can we evaluate the welfare consequences of seemingly irrational public preferences?

If the arguments in Part IV.A.2 are correct, then taxpayers are not rational in the manner predicted by classical economics: they should not prefer a dollar of tax spending to a dollar of direct spending. Public support and public welfare should be the same in both cases—but we show that this does not hold true.

Might public welfare remain the same, even if public preferences are susceptible to the framing effect? Some argue that this might be the case. Weisbach and Nussim, for example, suggest that outcome equivalence implies welfare equivalence. In other words, the welfare effect—that is, the effect on utility—of a $1000 check should be the same as the welfare effect of a $1000 tax credit, even if the public says it prefers one over the other. But our results suggest that this is not necessarily so: people may react differently if they receive the same $1000 in a different manner (as a reduction in taxes, or paying the higher tax and receiving a $1000 check).

These results showing the framing effect are nonetheless hard to interpret. Indeed, some scholars have concluded that this kind of “equivalency framing,” in which two identical options receive different levels of support depending on how they are described, renders preferences “uninterpretable.” But in studying the potential divergence between public welfare and public preferences, we contribute to the growing interest in interpreting the welfare implications of behavioral economics.

135 Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 25, at 958 (“Welfare is the same regardless of whether the program is formally part of the tax system or is located somewhere else in the government.”)
136 See id.
137 For a rich discussion of this point, see Druckman, supra note 32 at 234 (“The implication is that equivalency framing effects render peoples’ preferences uninterpretable. For example, when people prefer an economic program described as resulting in 95% employment but then oppose the same program when told that it will result in 5% unemployment, it is impossible to determine if they support or oppose the program (i.e., the preferences are irreconcilable).”).
2. Implications for Trends in Tax Law

Perhaps more centrally, our results also have implications for a longstanding debate in tax law and policy: why have tax expenditures continued to increase, despite repeated efforts to expose and restrain their cost? Since Surrey’s original writings on the subject, there has been a concerted effort at both the federal and state levels to make tax expenditures a more public part of the budgeting process—in other words, to make sure that policymakers are forced to publicly account for their spending through the tax code.\(^{139}\)

But, according to some recent critics, these efforts have failed to slow the growth of tax expenditures.\(^{140}\)

There have been several prominent efforts to address this apparent paradox.\(^{141}\) One line of analysis emphasizes that, but for the budgeting requirements, the growth rate of tax expenditures would have been “even more robust.”\(^{142}\) Another argues that public efforts to publicize tax expenditures have so far been meek and ineffective. Edward Kleinbard, for example, has argued that the current federal tax expenditure budgeting scheme “is expressly designed to avoid leaving any visible imprint on the budget, and the programs so favored have not been forced to compete with other spending programs for scarce Government resources in other committees or among the members as a whole.”\(^{143}\) A third line of analysis, favored by Edward Zelinsky, argues that tax expenditure budgeting “legitimates tax expenditures and encourages a scramble [among interest groups] for parity in the form of comparable tax benefits.”\(^{144}\)

Our results have implications for this debate. In particular, we show that there is likely to be more demand for spending through the tax code even if more transparent “budgeting” or “disclosure” takes place. A major constraint on a legislator’s willingness to enact new spending measures is the way in which new policies will be viewed by constituents—and, naturally, politicians running for elected office have incentives to propose policies and frame policies in a manner that appeals to the median voter. Our results suggest that constituents will be more likely to view tax expenditures more positively than general outlays, which in turn suggests that the scales might always be tilted in favor of spending measures that flow through the tax code.\(^{145}\)

\(^{139}\) See Zelinsky, supra note 12, at 3-4.

\(^{140}\) See generally Zelinsky, supra note 12. Or course, it might be the case that the growth in tax expenditures would, but for tax expenditure budgets, be much worse. But it is difficult to imagine the kind of randomized experiment that would allow for testing this proposition.

\(^{141}\) The contours of this debate are outlined in Zelinsky, supra note 12.


\(^{144}\) Zelinsky, supra note 12, at 5.

\(^{145}\) This does not mean that we should expect that all direct spending will be routed through the tax code. For the reasons that Weisbach and Nussim outline, it may be impractical or very costly to route some programs, such as food stamps, through the tax code and therefore these programs are not administered as tax expenditures, even if they would be more popular if they were. See
Spending through the tax code is what Chong and Druckman refer to as a “strong frame”: frames that “emerge from public discussion as the best rationales for contending positions on the issue.”\textsuperscript{146} Since the “typical political strategy is to connect a proposal to a positive idea or value that is widely available in the population,”\textsuperscript{147} we believe that the basic and stable public bias in favor of spending through the tax code helps explain the enormous rise of tax expenditures.

3. The Perverse Effects of Existing Tax Expenditure Budgets

A powerful tradition of legal thought suggests that transparency is normally good (or, in Justice Brandeis’s memorable phrase, sunlight is the best disinfectant\textsuperscript{148}). Likewise, the emphasis of the conversation over tax expenditures has been about making them more transparent through a process of tax expenditure budgeting.\textsuperscript{149} The thought is simple: “if policymakers, the media, and the general public lack information about tax expenditures, they cannot fully participate in decisions about how to allocate state resources.”\textsuperscript{150}

The question of when and how to give the public information about tax expenditures is very much alive. Tax transparency is a perennial subject of the policy debate,\textsuperscript{151} and the implementation of tax expenditure budgets is becoming increasingly common. The federal government is required to produce an annual tax expenditure report, as are many states. While tax expenditures still typically receiving less scrutiny than direct spending,\textsuperscript{152} the trend continues to be toward requiring more disclosure about tax expenditures. In some states, like Connecticut\textsuperscript{153} and Minnesota,\textsuperscript{154} the reporting

\textsuperscript{146} Chong & Druckman supra note 32 at 116.
\textsuperscript{147} Id.
\textsuperscript{148} LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”).
\textsuperscript{150} JASON LEVITIS ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, PROMOTING STATE BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH TAX EXPENDITURE REPORTING I (2009).
\textsuperscript{152} See LEVITIS ET AL., supra note 105, at 1 (“States typically require extensive documentation of how much direct spending they do each year, and their budget processes entail evaluation of each item. Tax expenditures usually receive far less scrutiny.”).
\textsuperscript{153} See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-7b(a) (West 2008); see also OFFICE OF FISCAL ANALYSIS, CONNECTICUT TAX EXPENDITURE REPORT (2012), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/ofa/
requirements and publications are extensive. Furthermore, as of 2011 only four states did not require some form of tax expenditure budgeting, falling from nine in of 2009.  

This trend toward tax expenditure budgeting and related transparency is usually viewed as beneficial. As the Joint Committee on Taxation recently put it, “[t]ax expenditure analysis can help both policymakers and the public to understand the actual size of government, the uses to which government resources are put, and the tax and economic policy consequences that follow from the implicit or explicit choices made in fashioning legislation.” Yet despite the enthusiasm for tax expenditure disclosure, the growth of tax spending has consistently eclipsed the growth of government spending as a whole. 

Our results suggest that recent efforts to expose the true costs of tax expenditures can be ineffective and perhaps even counterproductive. In broad strokes, existing efforts to disclose tax expenditures might have two effects. First, they might make the public more aware of the general equivalence between taxing and spending programs, and perhaps, as intended, instruct the public about the true costs of tax expenditures. But, second, they might make the public think more about how the budget is organized, and thus normalize the broad range of policies that are organized through the tax code. This in turn may make it seem perfectly appropriate to use tax expenditures to implement a new social benefit scheme in the future, where before tax expenditures seemed unusual and only appropriate in specific areas. 

If such normalization occurs, we should expect it to increase both the relative spending on tax expenditures and total spending. Relative spending increases because legislatures, responding to public preferences, substitute spending through the tax code for direct spending. Absolute spending increases because the public thinks spending through the tax code is spending on the cheap. Thus, if the public consistently prefers spending


155 See Leachman, et al., supra note 7, at 38-43.


157 This idea is similar to Zelinsky’s point that tax-expenditure budgeting might counterproductively “encourage[] a scramble [among interest groups] for parity in the form of comparable tax benefits.” Zelinsky, supra note 12, at 5. But instead of emphasizing the desires of special interests, we suggest that budgeting might also affect the public directly, by making citizens aware of the many forms tax expenditures can take. Likewise, while Haselswerdt and Bartels’s do not talk about tax expenditure budgeting, it also parallels their belief that when people are more familiar with government support arriving through tax expenditures in a policy area, this increases support for use of tax expenditures in the future in that area. Haselswerdt and Bartels, supra note 48, at 7-8.

158 This idea follows the well-known income and substitution effects in microeconomic theory.
through the tax code—even if they have more information about the equivalence of that spending—giving them information about the size and prevalence of tax expenditures might actually make tax expenditures more popular.

Our results do suggest that the framing effect is relatively robust to additional information. People’s opinions did not change when they were given clear information about the mechanics of the tax expenditure. Even when citizens were given explicit information about the cost of the program—exactly the type of information that they would see in a tax expenditure budget—they continued to think tax expenditures should be classified as less expensive.¹⁵⁹

This is not to say more information will never help. People who spend a lot of time thinking about the equivalence of tax expenditures and direct outlays, like tax professors,¹⁶⁰ probably are less likely to care about the frame. But what our results do show is that the type of information typically disclosed in tax expenditure budgets does not have much effect on the public’s preference for tax expenditures. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing; it might simply mean that the public is getting more of what it wants and people are happier for it. But it does suggest that if the modern-day Surreys want to press their campaign against tax expenditures, they should consider a different tack.

In some ways, the notion that tax expenditure budgets might normalize tax expenditures should not be surprising: It connects to a growing literature that is skeptical of whether mandatory disclosure will always help.¹⁶¹ Disclosing CEO salaries, for example—intended to shame companies away from excessive compensation packages and curb agency problems—might actually increase the overall level of CEO pay, since it makes price competition for CEOs all the more explicit, and all CEOs want to be paid more than average.¹⁶² Likewise, informing employees of their coworkers’ salaries might reduce job satisfaction, since no one wants to get paid less than the median employee.¹⁶³ Increasingly the transparency of medical prices could, in some instances, increase medical costs—since no one wants to pay for a cheaper than average surgeon.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁹ In addition, we also find evidence that, despite widespread tax-expenditure budgeting, the term has little meaning to the public.
¹⁶⁰ We think testing this would make an interesting extension.
¹⁶³ See David Card, Alexandre Mas, Enrico Moretti & Emmanuel Saez, Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 2981 (2012).
Likewise, publicly documenting the popularity of tax expenditures might have the effect of making tax expenditures more popular.

4. Implications for Tax Complexity

Moreover, if it’s true that the public’s stubborn preference for tax expenditures explains much of their recent growth, that same preference may also help explain another much-derided feature of tax policy that has frustrated many tax scholars: tax complexity. A public bias in favor of spending through the tax code is an overlooked explanation for why the tax code has become so complex. Typical explanations for tax complexity focus on interest group pressure, assuring tax fairness, and reducing tax fraud. But a robust public predisposition for spending through the tax code—combined with an electoral system in which politicians are motivated to pursue and frame policies that appeal to the median voter—also inevitably adds to the confusion of the tax system.

Indeed, when ordinary taxpayers confront their taxes, the most complex items they deal with are generally tax expenditures. For salaried or wage employees, calculating gross income is relatively easy: enter your W-2 and, if you have any investments, take the income figures from the 1099 given by your broker or financial institution. On the other hand, calculating deductions and credits is much trickier. A few relevant deductions are expenses related to earning taxable income. But the rest are tax expenditures: the mortgage interest deduction, deduction for state and local taxes, mortgage insurance deduction, the EITC, the adoption credit, the child tax credit, the “astonishingly complex credits designed to offset the cost of college tuition,” the charitable donation deduction, retirement accounts—the list goes on. The IRS estimates that the average individual spends eight hours on their taxes each year, between record keeping and actually filing. We think it is likely that the vast majority of this is spent dealing with eligibility for tax expenditures. Thus, taxpayers’ preference for spending through the tax code is part of what drives 84% of Americans to call the federal tax system complex.

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184 For example, expenses incurred while moving to a new job.
186 See http://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1040/ar03.html
187 The standard deduction is designed to insulate many taxpayers from the hassles of dealing with these issues, but even non-itemizers must deal with credits of various kinds and the rules surrounding retirement accounts if they have one.
188 See http://taxfoundation.org/article/topline-results-tax-foundations-2009-survey-us-attitudes-taxes-government-spending-and-wealth. Of course, even if the tax expenditures were instead direct outlays, a different government agency would need to determine eligibility and administer them, perhaps leading to equal aggravation for citizens.
V. CONCLUSION

Understanding the use of tax expenditures is one of the most important issues in government spending. As noted above, the CBO estimates that federal tax expenditures will be $1.4 trillion in the 2014 fiscal year.\footnote{CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 3, at 90.} If total spending is higher because (all else being equal) citizens have a persistent and systematic bias in favor of spending through the tax code, then billions of dollars are at stake. For example, if tax expenditures are a mere 2% higher because of greater public support for spending through the Code, then this $28 billion would be as much money as the President’s proposed energy budget (including clean energy initiatives—$27 billion)\footnote{OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (2013) at 85, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2014/assets/budget.pdf [http://perma.cc/62SC-VX68].} or the entire budget of the DOJ (including federal prisons and the FBI—$27 billion).\footnote{Id. at 119.}

Are citizens really competent to make these important decisions of tax policy and public spending? A relatively uncontroversial feature of democratic theory is that the government should be responsive to citizen preferences. But this suggests an analogous conclusion, discussed at some length in the political science literature: for government to be responsive to citizen preferences, citizens must be capable of forming preferences.\footnote{See Druckman supra note 32, at 232.}

What does it mean for citizens to be capable of forming competent preferences? Some political scientists argue that competent preferences “should not be based on arbitrary aspects of how an issue or problem is described”\footnote{Id.}—a criterion that resembles the well-known “independence of irrelevant alternatives” condition in the social choice literature.\footnote{See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 26 (2d ed. 1970).} But when framing effects cause the public to respond differently to equivalent proposals, the democratic competence of the citizenry is thrown into doubt.\footnote{See Chong & Druckman supra note 60 at 121-22.}

This problem is different from one that is often raised in analyses of the public’s relationship to the tax system. Often, the emphasis is on public ignorance of the mechanics of tax administration.\footnote{Sheffrin, for instance, writes that the “tax system is one of our most complex social contrivances and, realistically, one can only expect there to be limited knowledge about it.” Sheffrin, supra note 37, at 311.} But the framing effect creates a different worry. It suggests that even if the public were much more fully aware of how the tax system works, public preferences would still be susceptible to “arbitrary” changes in wording and frames.
 Frames are, of course, an inevitable feature of life. But they are an underappreciated part of the ways in which the tax law and policy has been shaped over the last hundred years. The main focus of the tax law literature has been on normative features of taxation. But our analysis suggests that this emphasis is incomplete. However worthy those normative considerations might be, they run up against the stable and enduring public bias in favor of pursuing policies through the tax code.

VI. APPENDIX

As discussed in the body of the Note, Google Consumer Survey (GCS) is a “survey wall,” that pops up when users want to access premium content, much like a paywall. GCS is used by “130 publishers in the U.S.” including “[t]hree of the top 10 newspapers, seven of the top 15 . . . sites like the New York Daily News, Christian Science Monitor, and . . . the LA Times.” The network also includes small news sites like Lima, Ohio News and the Texas Tribune as well as Pandora and Youtube, and various other arts and entertainment sites.

Visitors to these sites cannot opt into the surveys. Instead, they are solicited using a model that is designed to ensure a representative sample. The algorithm over samples groups which are currently underrepresented in the sample as the sampling progresses. That is, if say women, 18-24 from the South were underrepresented in the sample relative to the portion of the underlying internet using population they make up (as measured by the Census’ Current Population Survey), then that group would receive proportionally more survey requests. This is known as stratified sampling, but GCS’s ability to receive responses in real time makes it different from traditional stratified methods where the stratification (that is, which groups are over sampled) is set before the survey begins.

The screen shot below, displaying Question 10, shows how one of our questions would show up. The order in which the answers are displayed is randomized (i.e. the “Yes” option will equally often show up after “No,” as before it).

210 KEETER & CHRISTIAN, supra note 99, at 3.
211 See id.; McDonald, Mohebbi & Slatkin, supra note 48, at 3-4.
Response Time
Taking one of our questions, Question 10 as an example, the image below shows the distribution of how long participants took to respond to the question.
On average, participants took 36 seconds. Excluding participants who took more than 2 minutes to respond, the average response time was 20 seconds. There does not appear to be any binding upper time limit. One respondent took 54 minutes to respond (though we doubt he was lost in thought about tax expenditures the whole time).