Abstract - Under traditional formulations, lower capital income tax rates reduce the user cost of capital and stimulate investment. The traditional approach, however, implicitly or explicitly considers a revenue–neutral reduction in capital income taxation. We extend the traditional approach by considering a reduction in taxes that generates an increase in the budget deficit; the expanded budget deficit may raise interest rates and the opportunity cost of investment. This provides a mechanism through which tax cuts can raise the cost of capital. Representative calculations show that, even with relatively modest interest rate effects, the net effect of making the Administration’s recent tax cuts permanent or a 10 percent reduction in individual income tax rates would be to raise the user cost of capital. Thus, sustained tax cuts can raise the cost of capital and reduce investment.

INTRODUCTION

One of the principal goals of tax reform efforts is to improve the long-run performance of the economy. A frequently observed manifestation of this goal is the provision of tax incentives for firms to boost productive investment in equipment and structures. Traditionally, the effects of tax policy on firms’ demand for investment are summarized in estimates of the “user cost of capital.” The user cost of a capital investment is the minimum return a firm needs to cover depreciation, taxes, and the opportunity costs of the funds used to finance the project (Jorgenson, 1963; Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Auerbach, 1983b). Lower user costs typically translate into higher investment levels.

All previous analyses find that lower tax rates generally reduce the user cost. These studies, however, have either explicitly or implicitly considered revenue–neutral tax changes and assumed a fixed opportunity cost of funds. In other words, the analyses assume that changes in tax policy do not affect the required after–all–taxes return that investors demand.

This paper extends the traditional user cost framework to allow tax policy to affect investors’ required after–all–taxes return. Specifically, tax changes that raise or reduce federal
revenues typically also change federal borrowing, which may influence the interest rate on government debt. When the after–tax interest rate on government bonds changes, the after–all–taxes return that investors demand on other investments should change, too.

We assess the empirical importance of this effect by analyzing two tax policy options: the Administration’s recent tax cuts (made permanent) and a 10 percent across–the–board reduction in individual income tax rates. We show that when the analysis includes even relatively modest effects of deficits on interest rates, the net effect of the tax cuts in question is to raise the user cost of capital under almost all of the scenarios considered. These results suggest that incorporating the effects of tax cuts on deficits and the resulting impact on interest rates is a first–order consideration in evaluating the effects of tax policy on investment. In particular, sustained tax cuts can actually raise the cost of capital, once deficit and interest rate effects are taken into account.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the standard user cost model and extends the framework to allow tax policy to affect the interest rate on government debt. The third section describes the policy scenarios we simulate. The fourth section develops the parameter values. The fifth section presents the main results. The sixth section concludes.

A MODEL OF THE USER COST OF CAPITAL

Standard Model

As noted previously, the user cost of capital is the minimum rate of return a corporation needs on an investment to break even—that is, to cover the costs of the asset’s depreciation, to pay the associated taxes on the investment, and to compensate investors for the funds they provide. The standard formula for the user cost of capital for a firm making a $1 investment is

\[ c = \frac{(r – \pi + \delta)}{1 - u}(1 - uz), \]

where \( c \) is the user cost of capital, \( r \) is the nominal after–corporate–tax discount rate that the firm must earn to attract investors, \( \pi \) is the rate of inflation, \( \delta \) is the rate of economic depreciation, \( u \) is the statutory corporate tax rate, and \( z \) is the present value of depreciation deductions on a $1 investment. In [1], \( r – \pi \) is the opportunity cost of the investment, \( \delta \) represents depreciation, and the term \((1 – uz)/(1 – u)\) summarizes the impact of corporate taxes.1

The key variable for our purposes is \( r \), the nominal after–corporate–tax return that the firm must earn to attract investors. All individual–level taxes and other issues affecting the opportunity cost of invest-

---

1 The formulation of [1] is based on many simplifying assumptions, including: expectations of future policy and asset prices are static; there are no adjustment costs to investment; the asset is never resold; the economic depreciation of the capital good occurs at an exponential rate; and there is a constant marginal cost of new capital goods, which makes the price of capital goods exogenous to the firm. The formula also incorporates approximations, such as approximating the real interest rate, \((1 + r)/(1 + \pi) – 1\), by \( r – \pi \). The classic studies of user costs and investment are Jorgenson (1963) and Hall and Jorgenson (1967), which develop equation [1]. More recent studies, using [1] or variants of it, include Auerbach (1983a, 1989), Auerbach and Hassett (1992, 2003), Carroll, Hassett, and Mackie (2003), Chirinko (1993), Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (1999), Clark (1979, 1993), Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1994), Desai and Goolsbee (2004), Goolsbee (1998), and Poterba and Summers (1983, 1985). Equation [1] and its variants represent an uneasy compromise between alternative theories of firm capital structure, dividend policy, and corporate and individual portfolio choices and arbitrage options. The equation also omits a variety of tax and non–tax factors that may be relevant for investment choices. For excellent discussions of these and related issues, see Auerbach (1983b), Gravelle (1994), Hassett and Hubbard (1997), King and Fullerton (1984), Mackie (2002), Sinn (1990a, 1990b), and Sorenson (1995).
ment, such as the interest rate on government bonds, enter equation [1] through $r$. The required nominal after-corporate-tax return will be a function of the allocation of financing of new investment projects:

$$r = x_E r_E + x_D r_D,$$

where $x_E$ is the share of new investment financed by equity, $x_D$ is the share of new investment financed by debt ($= 1 - x_E$), $r_E = \text{investors' required nominal after-corporate-tax return on equity-financed investments}$, and $r_D = \text{investors' required nominal after-corporate-tax return on debt-financed investments}$.

Let investors' required real return on corporate equity after corporate and individual income taxes, $s_E$, be given by

$$s_E = (1 - t_E) r_E - \pi,$$

where $t_E$ is the effective tax rate on nominal equity income in the individual income tax. The equation for $t_E$ is given by:

$$t_E = pm + (1 - p)w,$$

and

$$t_E = w,$$

where $p = \text{the dividend payout rate (= dividends/(dividends and retained earnings))}$, $m = \text{the effective marginal tax rate on dividends in the individual income tax}$, and $w = \text{the effective marginal tax rate on accrued capital gains in the individual income tax}$.

Similarly, let investors' required real return on corporate debt after corporate and personal income taxes ($s_D$) be given by

$$s_D = (1 - t_D) r_D - \pi,$$

where $t_D = \text{the effective marginal tax rate on nominal interest income from corporate bonds in the individual income tax}$.


$$r = x_E \left( \frac{s_E + \pi}{1 - t_E} \right) + x_D \left( \frac{s_D + \pi}{1 - t_D} \right).$$

Equation [6] implies that $r$ depends on investors' opportunity costs (i.e., the real required after-all-tax returns on debt and equity), the effective marginal individual income tax rates on income from corporate debt and equity, the financing shares, and the rate of inflation.

Traditionally, formulations in the user cost literature specify $r$ as in equation [6] (see Mackie, 2002 or Carroll, Hassett, and Mackie, 2003, for example) or as a constant (see Hall and Jorgenson, 1967, or Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard, 1994, for example). In the first case, $s_E$ and $s_D$ are held constant over tax policy changes; in the latter case, the entire expression in [6] is fixed. In either case, changes in the interest rate on government debt are assumed not to affect the user cost. We modify this assumption below.

**Extensions**

Let investors' required real return on government bonds after personal income taxes be

$$s_G = (1 - t_G) i_G - \pi,$$

where $i_G = \text{the nominal interest rate on government bonds}$, and $t_G = \text{the effective
marginal tax rate on nominal interest income from government bonds in the individual income tax.

The precise nature of the links between the returns to government bonds, corporate bonds, and corporate equity depends on a host of factors that influence financial markets. In lieu of developing a structural model that explicitly addresses these factors, we explore three possible benchmarks that span a considerable range of options. The simplest specification would equate real after–tax returns across assets

\[ s_E = s_G \]  
\[ s_D = s_G. \]

Substituting these equations into [7] and the results into [6] yields

\[ r = \left[ \frac{x_E (1-t_G)}{(1-t_E)} + \frac{x_D (1-t_G)}{(1-t_D)} \right] i_G + \frac{\alpha_E}{(1-t_E)} x_E + \frac{\alpha_D}{(1-t_D)} x_D, \]

This specification incorporates a role for risk and the equity premium, but holds the difference in returns constant on an after–tax basis for all tax rates. One implication is that if the tax rate on equity rose, the before–tax risk premium on equity must also rise. In some situations, however, this implication may be inappropriate. As a simple (perhaps extreme) example, consider a tax on the excess return on an investment. If such a tax increased, an investor’s willingness to hold the asset should not change (because the higher tax reduces but does not eliminate the windfall from the excess return), so the required before–tax return and the before–tax risk premium should not change. But since overall taxes on the investment rose, the difference in after–tax returns between equity and government bonds would fall. The situation would be somewhat more complex when the entire return is taxed, but the basic idea is the same: Under plausible circumstances, the difference between the required after–tax return on equity and government bonds could fall as tax rates on equity rise. Similar considerations apply to corporate bonds. One way to allow for such effects is to specify that

\[ s_E = s_G + \alpha_E (1-t_E), \]
\[ s_D = s_G + \alpha_D (1-t_D), \]

where \( \alpha_E \) is a measure of the equity premium, \( \alpha_D \) is a risk spread reflecting the difference in the required return on corporate bonds relative to government bonds, and both \( \alpha \) terms are constant. These equations imply that

\[ r = \left[ \frac{x_E (1-t_G)}{(1-t_E)} + \frac{x_D (1-t_G)}{(1-t_D)} \right] i_G + \alpha_E x_E + \alpha_D x_D. \]
Equations [10.1], [10.2], and [10.3] generate the standard results that reducing the effective personal income tax rate on equity or corporate debt reduces investors’ required after–corporate–tax return \((dr/dt_E > 0, dr/dt_D > 0)\), holding other factors constant. In addition, in each of the equations, increases in the government borrowing rate raise \(r\):

\[
[11] \quad \frac{dr}{diG} = \frac{x_e(1-t_e)}{1-t_E} + \frac{x_d(1-t_d)}{1-t_D} > 0.
\]

This occurs because the higher interest rate raises the after–tax return on government bonds, which in equilibrium raises the effective hurdle rate for corporate investment projects. Thus, to the extent that tax cuts create budget deficits, and budget deficits raise government bond rates, the value of \(r\) will rise, as will the user cost. The increase in \(r\) due to an increase in \(i_G\) need not be one–for–one, however, because of the differing tax treatment of equity, debt, and government interest. Typically, the marginal effect of changes in \(i_G\) on \(r\) will be between 0 and 1 in absolute value because the effective personal income tax rate on equity is usually thought to be lower than the effective personal income tax rate on corporate or government debt (see the next section for further discussion).

We make one additional assumption that will have an important effect in the simulation analysis following, namely that changes in the tax rate on interest income from government bonds (financed by tax changes outside the model, so that the deficit is unaffected) do not affect the equilibrium after–tax return on government bonds. Formally, this requires that

\[
[12] \quad ds_G/dt_G = 0,
\]

which in turn requires that \(di_G/dt_G = i_G/(1-t_G)\).

Intuitively, this assumption is based on a scenario in which lower tax rates on interest income from government bonds raise investors’ demand for bonds, which drives the bond price up and the interest rate down. Equation [12] implies that this process continues until the after–tax return to government bonds, given in [7], is the same as it was before the cut in \(t_G\). Equation [12] is the most favorable assumption that could be made in this context for allowing tax cuts to reduce the cost of capital. If a cut in \(t_G\) led to no change in \(i_G\) or to a decline in \(i_G\) that was smaller in absolute value than implied by [12], inspection of [10.1], [10.2], and [10.3] shows that \(r\) would rise, as would the user cost of capital.

To summarize, the standard model shows the user cost to be a function of investors’ required nominal return after corporate taxes \((r)\), inflation, economic depreciation, the statutory corporate tax rate, and depreciation rules. The value of \(r\), in turn, is either held constant or is allowed to depend on the structure of financing; dividend payout ratios; effective marginal personal income tax rates on dividends, capital gains, and corporate interest payments; and investors’ required after–all–tax returns to debt and equity, in which the required returns are assumed constant with respect to tax policy. We extend this model by allowing investors’ required after–all–tax return on corporate debt and equity to depend on the after–tax return they can obtain on government bonds. As a result, our model shows that changes in tax revenues that change government borrowing can affect the user cost by affecting the interest rate on government bonds.

**Effective Tax Rate**

As previously noted, the user cost is the real, pre–tax, gross–of–depreciation return that is needed for a firm to
cover depreciation, taxes, and investors’ opportunity costs. The effective tax rate on an investment is defined as the share of the net-of-depreciation return that is taxed.\footnote{Alternatively and equivalently, the effective tax rate is the statutory tax rate that, if applied to economic income from the investment project, would yield the same investment incentive as the various features of the tax code modeled in equations [1] and [10]. See Auerbach (1983b) or Mackie (2002) for further elaboration.} Thus, defining \( c \) as the user cost, \( \delta \) as the depreciation rate, and \( r^* – \pi \) as the opportunity cost of the investor funds, the effective tax rate (\( ETR \)) is given by

\[
ETR = \frac{(c - \delta) - (r^* - \pi)}{(c - \delta)},
\]

where \( r^* = i^*_c + x_c \alpha_c + x_G \alpha_G \) and represents the opportunity cost of funds in a world in which all marginal income tax rates are zero and revenues are collected via lump sum taxes. The equation for \( r^* \) is derived by setting all of the marginal income tax rates in \([10.2]\) or \([10.3]\) equal to zero. If risk and equity premia are ignored, \( r^* = i^*_c \) from \([10.1]\). Recall from \([12]\) that \( s_G \) is held constant with respect to \( t_G \). Thus, in the simulations, \( i^*_c \) is set so that \( s_G \) given \( t_G = 0 \), is the same as it is in the baseline scenario.\footnote{To be concrete, in the baseline developed in section three, \( i^*_c = 0.06 \) and \( t_G = 0.262 \), so that \((1 - t_G)i^*_c = 0.04428 \). Hence, with \( t_G \) set to zero in the ETR calculation, we set \( i^*_c = 0.04428 \).}

POLICY SCENARIOS

To provide some perspective on the potential importance of the theoretical analysis previously discussed, we estimate how two sets of tax policy changes would alter the user cost of capital for corporate investments in equipment and structures. In each case, we parameterize equation [1], using \([10.1]\), \([10.2]\), or \([10.3]\) as the specification of \( r \), under a variety of assumptions. Because we are specifically interested in the medium- and long-term effects of tax policy on growth, we examine the implied effects of the tax policy changes on the user cost of capital as of 2014 (the end of the Congressional Budget Office’s 10-year budget window at the time the initial version of this paper was drafted). For each policy scenario, the baseline is pre-2001 tax law, applied to the year 2014.

We also include estimates of how tax policy changes the \( ETR \) (as defined in equation [13]) on corporate investments. For the first policy change described below, our \( ETR \) estimates can be compared to results from the Department of Treasury (2004, 2005). The Treasury \( ETR \) calculations do not allow the government borrowing rate to change due to changes in the deficit, and for the purposes of comparability, we similarly do not allow the government borrowing rate to change in calculating the \( ETR \).

Making the Administration’s Tax Cuts Permanent

The central scenario we analyze is an extension of almost all features of the Bush Administration’s 2001 tax cuts (many of which were extended or accelerated in 2003 and 2004), along with the dividend and capital gains tax cuts enacted in 2003. Specifically, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA or “the 2001 tax cut”) reduced the top four income tax rates, carved a 10 percent bracket out of the existing 15 percent bracket, repealed PEP and PEASE (the phaseout of personal exemptions and limitations on itemized deductions), reduced and eventually repealed the estate tax, expanded the child credit, reduced marriage penalties, expanded tax preferences for saving and education, and raised the alternative minimum tax exemption. All of these provisions were temporary, however, expiring by the end of 2010. The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconsideration of the Effects of Tax Policy on Investment

Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA or “the 2003 tax cut”) accelerated the phase-in of some of these provisions and reduced the taxation of capital gains and dividends. The Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 (WFTRA or “the 2004 tax cut”) extended the accelerated, phased-in levels of many provisions through 2010. Like the 2001 tax cut, the 2003 and 2004 acts provided temporary tax reductions only.7

In its Fiscal Year 2006 budget, introduced in February 2005, the Administration proposes making almost all of these provisions permanent (Office of Management and Budget, 2005). In our “permanent tax cuts” scenario, we consider the effects of the tax cuts above, plus the enactment of the Administration’s proposal to extend the tax cuts. In addition, we extend the AMT exemption at its current nominal level and make permanent the use of nonrefundable personal credits against the AMT for education and dependent care.

Ten Percent across-the-board Individual Income Tax Rate Reduction

In the second policy scenario, rather than examine the tax cuts that were enacted or have been proposed, we examine the effects of an across-the-board 10 percent reduction in statutory individual income tax rates—including capital gains tax rates and AMT tax rates—beginning in 2001. The estate tax, payroll tax, and corporate tax remain as in pre-2001 law.

PARAMETER VALUES

For each of the policy scenarios, we set the statutory corporate tax rate ($u$) at 35 percent, the rate of inflation ($\pi$) at 3 percent, and the dividend payout ratio ($p$) at 50 percent (following several recent studies). Following Gravelle (1994), we set the present value of depreciation deductions per dollar of investment (given by $z$) equal to .83 for equipment and .54 for structures, and the annual rate of economic depreciation ($\delta$) at .15 for equipment and .03 for structures.8

We allow for either 100 percent equity financing ($x_E = 1.00$) or a combination of 65 percent equity financing and 35 percent debt financing. We examine scenarios with no equity and risk premia [10.1], with constant equity and risk premia ([10.2], with $\alpha_E = .03$, $\alpha_D = .01$) and with equity and risk premia adjusted for tax rates [10.3]. We estimate results under the “old view” and the “new view” (with the distinction affecting the formula for $t_E$ as discussed previously). The other key parameters are the individual income tax rates on capital income and the interest rate on government borrowing, which are explored in the discussion following.

Individual Income Tax Rates on Capital Income

We estimate the effective marginal income tax rates on income from dividends, capital gains, and interest income (assuming that the tax rate on interest income

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6 In 2004, Congress enacted and the President signed another tax bill as well (the American Jobs Creation Act) that we ignore here.

7 See Gale and Orszag (2004b) and Joint Committee on Taxation (2001, 2003, and 2004). Note that we do not extend the bonus depreciation provisions that were enacted in 2002, expanded in 2003, and expired at the end of 2004.

8 Technically, $z$ should be a function of $r$ (see Hall and Jorgenson, 1967 and Gravelle, 1994 for careful discussions of this issue). That is, increases in $r$ should raise the rate at which future depreciation deductions are discounted and hence reduce $z$. This in turn would raise the user cost, above and beyond the increase caused by raising $r$ but holding $z$ constant. We do not include this effect, but adding it to the analysis would work in the direction of accentuating the results we obtain. Some suggestive calculations indicate that the added effect is not very large.
from government bonds is the same as
the tax rate on interest income from cor-
porate bonds) using the Tax Policy Center
microsimulation model. Tax rates for 2014
under the pre–2001 tax law baseline and
under each of the policy scenarios are
shown in Table 1.

To determine the marginal tax rates on
income from dividends (interest, capital
gains) for taxable investors, we increase
dividends (interest, capital gains) by
$1,000 for each record in the TPC model,
calculate the increase in income tax li-
ability in dollars, and divide by $1,000.
This generates a marginal tax rate for each
record. These record–specific values are
weighted by shares of the type of income
and sampling weights to generate an
estimate of the overall weighted aver-
age effective marginal tax rate by type of
income. For capital gains, we then divide
the estimated marginal tax rate in half to
account for the fact that gains are taxed
on realization rather than accrual, which
allows investors to reduce the effective tax
rate by deferring the realization and/or
the timing the realization of gains to offset
the realization of losses. The marginal tax
rate levels and changes shown in Table 1
are consistent with those in Kiefer et al.
(2002), using the Treasury tax model for
taxable investors.

A large share of capital income, how-
ever, accrues to investors who do not pay
federal income taxes, including non–prof-
its, pension funds, state and local govern-
ments, and some foreigners. To allow for
this, we calculate the effective marginal
tax rate for all investors by dividing the
marginal tax rates for taxable investors
in half (see Mackie, 2002; Gale and Pot-
ter, 2002; and Gordon, Kalambokidis,
and Slemrod, 2003 for further discussion).
These tax rates and changes are consistent
with those in Dennis et al. (2004) using the
CBO tax model for all investors.

Federal Borrowing Rate

We assume that under pre–EGTRRA
law, the nominal federal government
borrowing rate ($i_G$) would have been six
percent in 2014. With the assumptions
previously discussed, this generates a real,
after–tax rate of return on Treasury debt
of just under 1.5 percent.

As noted above, the borrowing rate can
be affected by two aspects of tax changes.
First, the lower tax rate on interest income
from government bonds will tend to re-

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investor Group</th>
<th>Pre–EGTRRA Law (Baseline)</th>
<th>Tax Cuts Extended</th>
<th>10% Reduction in Individual Tax Rates</th>
<th>Percentage Change from Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxable Investors</td>
<td>$t_x = p_m + (1 – p)w$</td>
<td>$t_x = p_m + (1 – p)w$</td>
<td>$t_x = p_m + (1 – p)w$</td>
<td>$t_x = p_m + (1 – p)w$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t_0$ (under the old view)</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>–8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m$</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>–52.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w$</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>–23.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t_E$ (under the old view)</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>–45.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Investors</td>
<td>$t_x = p_m + (1 – p)w$</td>
<td>$t_x = p_m + (1 – p)w$</td>
<td>$t_x = p_m + (1 – p)w$</td>
<td>$t_x = p_m + (1 – p)w$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t_0$ (under the old view)</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>–8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m$</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>–52.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w$</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>–23.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t_E$ (under the old view)</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>–45.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Under the old view, $t_x = p_m + (1 – p)w$, where $p$ is the dividend payout ratio, which is set at 0.50. Under the new view, $t_x = w$.

9 http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxmodel.
10 Taxable investors are those who are statutorily subject to the tax, even if they have no actual tax liability.
duce the interest rate. For example, the tax rate on government bonds falls from .262 under pre–EGTRRA law to .238 if the Administration’s tax cuts are made permanent, and satisfaction of equation [12] then requires that \( i_G \) fall to 5.81 percent before considering any effects of deficits on interest rates. Likewise, the tax rate on interest income falls to .235 under the 10 percent across–the–board tax cuts, which requires \( i_G \) to fall to 5.78 percent before consideration of deficit effects.

The second effect is the influence of higher federal deficits. To estimate these effects, we need to resolve two issues: the effects of the tax policies in question on federal deficits and debt, and the effects of federal deficits and debt on government interest rates.

To address the first issue, Table 2 reports the estimated effects of the different policy scenarios on the 2014 primary deficit, the 2014 unified deficit, and the 2014 debt/GDP ratio. Appendix Table 1 lists the revenue effects and the budget effects (including the added interest costs from higher federal debt payments but not from higher interest rates) under each scenario for each year from 2001 to 2014.

To address the second issue, the extent to which such changes in fiscal policy translate into changes in government borrowing rates, we appeal to a recent review of the literature we conducted in Gale and Orszag (2004a). At the risk of greatly oversimplifying, the overall literature on fiscal policy and interest rates in the United States is mixed, but studies that examine the effects of anticipated deficits tend to find positive effects on interest rates that are economically and statistically significant. Research by Laubach (2003), Engen and Hubbard (2004), and Gale and Orszag (2004a) uses a common data set and finds that, when only one fiscal variable is included in the equation, anticipated, sustained increases in primary deficits raise either long–term or forward interest rates by 32–46 basis points; similar increases in unified deficits raise interest rates by 18–39 basis points, and anticipated increases in the debt–to–GDP ratio of 1 percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Measure</th>
<th>Tax Cuts Extended</th>
<th>10% Reduction in Individual Tax Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(In Billions of Dollars)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Primary Deficit in 2014</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Unified Deficit in 2014</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Public Debt by 2014</td>
<td>4452</td>
<td>2555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a Percentage of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Measure</th>
<th>Tax Cuts Extended</th>
<th>10% Reduction in Individual Tax Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change in Primary Deficit in 2014</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Unified Deficit in 2014</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Public Debt by 2014</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Implied Effect on Government Interest Rates (Basis Points)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Rates</th>
<th>Tax Cuts Extended</th>
<th>10% Reduction in Individual Tax Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Deficit</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Deficit</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBO (2005, Table 1–2) and Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model.

1CBO (2005, Table 1–2) estimates GDP in 2014 to be $18,826 billion.

The revenue estimates for extended tax cuts come from CBO (2005); the revenue figures for the 10 percent tax cut come from the TPC microsimulation model; the interest calculations are based on the CBO interest matrix for January 2005. The estimates assume no offsetting change in other government spending or revenue. For an analysis of the “starve the beast” hypothesis under which the tax cuts would ostensibly put pressure on policy–makers to reduce spending, see Gale and Orszag (2004c).
point raise long–term rates by between 2.8 and 5.6 basis points. A recent estimate by President Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) is consistent with these results, suggesting that a persistent $100 billion annual increase in the deficit would raise long–term interest rates by about 30 basis points, which implies that a persistent increase in the unified deficit of 1 percent of GDP would raise interest rates by 43 basis points (Wall Street Journal 2003). To err on the conservative end of these ranges, we assume that an anticipated, sustained 10–year, 1 percent of GDP increase in the unified deficit would raise interest rates by 30 basis points and that a 1 percent of GDP increase in public debt would raise interest rates by 3 basis points. These estimates are consistent with Engen and Hubbard (2004) but lower than the estimates reported by the Bush Administration CEA in March 2003 and by several researchers noted previously. We also assume that an anticipated, sustained 1 percent of GDP increase in the primary deficit would raise interest rates by 40 basis points.

As shown in Table 2, these assumptions imply that, by 2014, government interest rates would rise by between 71 and 90 points if the Administration’s tax cuts were made permanent, and by between 41 and 51 basis points if tax rates were cut by 10 percent. In our simulations, to be conservative, we employ the lower bound estimate in each case: 71 basis points for the Administration’s tax cuts made permanent and 41 basis points for the 10 percent tax reduction. Thus, when the effects of deficits are included in the analysis following, the government borrowing rate is 6.52 percent (5.81 + 0.71) for the Administration’s tax cuts made permanent and 6.19 percent (5.78 + 0.41) under the 10 percent across–the–board tax cuts. When deficits are ignored, the rates are 5.81 and 5.78 percent, respectively.

RESULTS

Table 3 reports the effects of making the Administration’s tax cuts permanent. The estimates that do not allow for the effects of tax cuts on deficits and the resulting effect on interest rates reflect the traditional approach used in the previous literature. The estimates that incorporate macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy should be considered the impact on the user cost as of 2014.

In the cases that do not allow deficits to affect interest rates, our findings are consistent with traditional results. First, the user cost falls more in the old view than in the new view: Under the new view, the large tax cut on dividend income in 2003 does not affect the user cost, and the percentage reduction in $t_E$ is, therefore, larger under the old view (Table 1). Second, under the old view, the user cost falls more when the investment is financed 100 percent with equity because the percentage reductions in the tax rate on dividends and capital gains exceed the percentage tax cut on interest income (Table 1). Third, the effect on the user cost is smaller in absolute value when the marginal investor is assumed to be an average of taxable and non–taxable investors, because a significant share of all investors are non–taxable.

In addition, the reductions in the user cost are larger when equity and risk adjustments are assumed to be constant than

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13 At the time this estimate was provided, projected GDP for the next 10 years, 2004–13, was $144 billion (CBO, 2003).
### Table 3
Effects of Extended Tax Cuts on the User Cost of Capital, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old View or New View</th>
<th>Equity and Risk Adjustment</th>
<th>Taxable or All Investors</th>
<th>100% or 65% Equity Financing</th>
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<td>6.2</td>
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</table>

Source: Authors’ calculations.

¹Assuming no change in interest rates.
when they are related to the tax rate. This occurs because the reduction in $t_e$ and $t_D$ under the tax cuts affects the last two terms in [10.2] but not in [10.3].

The main result from Table 3, however, is that once the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy on interest rates are included, the tax cuts almost uniformly raise the user cost of capital. In 22 of the 24 cases examined, the net effect of the change—including both the direct effects of reductions in marginal tax rates and the indirect effects stemming from the tax cuts’ effects on deficits and the resulting impact on interest rates—is to raise the user cost.

The one significant exception is the case with the uniformly most optimistic set of assumptions (given the structure of the recent tax cuts): the old view, with 100 percent equity financing, taxable investors, and constant equity and risk adjustments included. Even in this case, although the user cost does not rise, the absolute value of the reduction in the user cost (and, hence, the impact on investment) shrinks by two-thirds for both equipment (from 4.2 percent without interest rate effects to 1.4 percent with interest rate adjustments) and for structures (from 9.8 percent without interest rate effects to 3.2 percent with interest adjustments). The one minor exception occurs under the same set of assumptions, except that financing is 65 percent equity. In this case, the user cost falls by 0.1 percent for equipment and 0.3 percent for structures. It is notable that all of the estimates that incorporate deficit effects and either exclude equity or risk premia adjustments or allow such adjustments to be endogenously affected by the tax rate find positive effects on the user cost once the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy are included. Likewise, all of the estimates that incorporate deficit effects and use the new view show a positive effect on the user cost.

Table 3 also shows different results for structures and equipment. When interest rate effects are ignored, the percentage reductions in the user cost of capital are larger for structures than equipment. When interest rate effects are included, the percentage increases in the user cost are larger for structures than equipment. This occurs as a purely mechanical result: because the depreciation rate for structures is smaller, a given arithmetic change in $r$ represents a larger percentage change (in absolute value) in the user cost for structures than for equipment.

Finally, we note the results for the effective tax rate in the last two columns. As mentioned earlier, these $ETR$ calculations do not allow for adjustments in interest rates due to deficits. These results show that reductions in the $ETR$ as traditionally calculated are consistent with increases in the user cost once interest rate effects are included in the latter calculations. In addition, the estimates can be compared to Treasury Department estimates. The Bush Administration tax policies enacted through 2004 (not including bonus depreciation, which we exclude as well) reduced the $ETR$ on corporate investment by 15–17 percent according to the Department of Treasury (2004, 2005). The first several rows of Table 3 show that it is possible to generate estimates of the same magnitude using the assumptions we employ, although most of our scenarios suggest smaller figures.

The tax changes enacted since 2001 create a significant amount of revenue loss from items that do not affect marginal tax rates on investment income very much if at all (for example, the expanded child credit and the 10 percent bracket). Thus, we also examine an alternative policy that reduces all marginal tax rates by 10 percent since 2001. As Dennis et al. (2004) point out, such a policy is likely to have a

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14 If effects of deficits are as described by the Bush Administration (in the text above), the user cost would rise for both equipment and structures, even under this scenario.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Old View or New View</th>
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Source: Authors’ calculations.

<sup>1</sup>Assuming no change in interest rates.
higher bang–for–the–buck for economic growth, since all of the tax revenue reductions are directly related to marginal incentives.

Table 4 reports results for this scenario. In all 24 cases, the net effect of the tax cut on the user cost of capital is positive when interest rate effects are considered.15

CONCLUSIONS

Tax policy can affect the economy in general and private investment in particular through direct and indirect channels. The direct channels include the standard income and substitution effects that alter households’ and firms’ budget constraints, holding prices constant. The indirect effects include the impact of tax cuts on deficits, and the resulting effect of higher government borrowing on national saving and interest rates (see Dennis et al., 2004, Gale and Potter, 2002).

Traditional analyses assume that tax policy cannot affect the opportunity cost of funds. This paper shows, however, that tax policy can influence investors’ after–all–tax return on investments by raising the interest rate on government bonds. Moreover, applying user cost formulas incorporating these effects to selected tax policy options suggests that these considerations are empirically important and can even reverse standard conclusions about tax cuts and investment.

In the particular example of making the Administration’s tax cuts permanent, the direct effect of the tax cuts is to reduce the user cost of capital in many cases, but the overall effect, including the impact on the government interest rate, is to raise the user cost. This casts some doubt on the notion that the tax cuts per se will be good for long–term growth, at least with regard to investment. It is worth emphasizing, too, that the interest rate effects considered were modest or conservative relative to recent estimates and were consistent with the estimates of both the Bush Administration and former Administration officials. In addition, our estimates of the change in the effective tax rate (which hold the interest rate constant) were broadly consistent with Administration estimates.

This work could be extended in several key directions. First, it would be interesting to know the importance of the deficit effect outlined previously for other tax policy changes, such as changes in the corporate tax rate or depreciation rules, or earlier tax reform episodes in 1981 or 1993. Second, it would also be of interest to expand the analysis to examine the impact of tax policy on the user cost of capital in other sectors, including small business and housing. (Gale and Potter, 2002 provide a preliminary analysis along these lines.) It would also be appropriate to consider the impact of non–deficit means of financing the tax cuts, especially since deficit finance only postpones the ultimate required change in spending or tax rules. Finally, as Abel (1990) and Hall (1994) have clarified, a full model of investment requires analysis of the demand and the supply side. An integration of the effects discussed here, which cover firms’ demand for investment, with an analysis of the supply of funds for investment, would be an important extension.

Acknowledgments

We thank Emil Apostolov, Matt Hall, Shannon Leahy, Catherine Lee, and Audrey Stern for outstanding assistance, and Alex Brill, John Diamond, Eric Engen, Jane Gravelle, Kevin Hassett, Drew

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15 The pattern of results across the specification of old view versus new view and the financing assumptions differ somewhat from Table 3 because the changes in the taxation of dividends, capital gains, and interest income in this policy scenario differ from the changes in the first policy scenario.
Lyon, Jay Mackie, and Samara Potter and especially Alan Auerbach for helpful discussions.

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## APPENDIX TABLE 1
EFFECTS OF TAX POLICY OPTIONS ON REVENUES AND INTEREST PAYMENTS, 2001–2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tax Cuts Extended</th>
<th>Revenue Loss</th>
<th>Interest Expense</th>
<th>Budget Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10% Reduction in Individual Tax Rates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1Entries in billions of dollars.
2As described in the text.